In the year 1808 Finland had been an integral part of the kingdom of Sweden for nearly 700 years. All decisions concerning Finland and its people were made in Stockholm; there were no special administrative arrangements for the Finns.

But in 1808, the political situation in Finland suddenly changed. Sweden became involved in the Napoleonic Wars and eventually had to cede its eastern provinces to Russia. However, Finland was not annexed to Russia as a governmental district, as was Russian practice of the time. Instead, Finland was granted its own constitution-based legislation and administration, even if the Russians had autocratic traditions. How was this possible and why did it happen?

This paper will first examine briefly how Finland was initially joined to Sweden and then review the political situation in Europe that led to the Russo-Swedish war (also known as the "Finnish War"), which ended the centuries-long union between Sweden and Finland. It will then describe the phases of the war and survey the foundation of Russian rule and the special autonomous position of Finland granted by Russia.

Finland as Part of Sweden

A common belief among Finns is that Finland was joined to Sweden as a consequence of the crusade by Eric IX of Sweden in 1155. However, Finland had got its first Swedish influences long before that: the first Swedes in Finland were the Vikings, who both traded with and plundered the Finns. The Vikings also brought their religion with them, so Christianity came to Finland before 1155¹. In addition, it is possible that the southwestern part of Finland had had certain political relations with Sweden even before the crusade. In the late 12th century, however, Swedish rule in Finland was reinforced (Vahtola 50-9).

Still, the Swedish rule was not official until the mid-13th century when the Finnish Church became a diocese of the Swedish Church. Even after that time the status of Finland, at that time known as Österland², was not fully recognized. For example, Finland was not entitled to participate in the election of the king³ until in 1362.

In 1581, Finland was granted the title Grand Duchy as a consequence of infighting between the sons of the late Swedish king Gustav Vasa. The title was relatively meaningless, as Finland was regarded as an integral part of the Swedish realm and therefore did not have a separate administration or any special rights that the rest of the kingdom would not have had. As in other Swedish provinces, there were some local administrative organs, but central administration was in the capital of Sweden. The only central administrative organ in Finland was the Turku Court of Appeal, founded in 1623. In addition, there had been some temporary administrative arrangements during wars or other crises, such as a special General Governor as a local "sovereign" or conventions of estates (Junnila 29; Österland).

Finnish-Russian Relations in the 18th Century

Finnish-Russian relations in the 18th century had a significant impact on the events of the early 19th century. In the 18th century Russia had started to enhance its political power: its population grew quickly, especially that of the newly founded (in 1703) capital, St. Petersburg, which was situated near the eastern border of Sweden (Finland). In 1750, the population of St. Petersburg was 95,000, whereas fifty years later it had risen to 220,000, being almost the size of London and Paris, the most important European cities of the time. As an emerging major power, Russia attracted officials, soldiers, and cultural figures from all over Europe (Tommila 58-9).

In 1700, Sweden, which had been one of the major powers of Europe in the 17th century, got engaged in the Great Northern War of 1700-21 against Russia, Denmark, and Poland. During this war that ended the major power era of Sweden, the Russians occupied the eastern parts of Sweden (virtually the whole of present-day Finland) between 1713-21. This era is known as the Greater Wrath, during which the Russians treated the Finns⁴ in a very brutal way. Around 5,000 Finns were killed and over 10,000 Finns were taken to Russia as forced laborers, soldiers, or concubines; only a few thousand of them came back. Villages and churches were plundered. In addition, the Russian occupiers imposed heavy taxes and other levies on the Finns. A large number of Finns fled to Sweden or hid in forests (Helsingin kaupunginmuseo; Österland; Mäntylä 271-2).

In the Treaty of Nystad (1721), Sweden lost its Baltic Territories and areas in Ingria. To reconquer these areas, Sweden started a new war in 1741, Hats´⁵ Russian War (1741-3). During this war, the Russians occupied Finland again, but this time the occupation was not as brutal as the Greater Wrath had been and is therefore called the Lesser Wrath (Mäntylä 296). The campaign was unsuccessful for Sweden: it had to cede eastern parts (see map) of Finland to the Russians in the Treaty of Åbo (Turku) 1743.

These two occupations, Sweden´s military weakness and uninterest in defending its eastern parts, and the constantly increasing political power of Russia made the Finns feel insecure. They started to think that Finland would sooner or later fall into the Russian empire. This pessimistic view was backed by ideas of the Enlightenment that emphasized economic and individual profit by suggesting, for example, that people were entitled to have a good ruler. A good ruler, in turn, was a sovereign who took care of his subjects by giving them peace, as constant warfare did not increase individual welfare. If a ruler could not give the subjects peace, they were entitled to change the ruler. These ideas of the Enlightenment gained ground in Finland, which had been impoverished by wars and occupations: why should the Finns stay with the belligerent Swedes when some other country might offer them better opportunities⁶? In consequence, during the 18th century the well-educated classes started to think that the inevitable future annexation to the Russian empire might not be such a bad idea. However, there was no need to hasten it (Tommila 60).

In the 1780s, a few separatist movements appeared in Finland. The most famous was the Anjala conspiracy, the members of which schemed with the Russians, wishing to accelerate the separation from Sweden. After the separation, they would have annexed Finland to Russia as an area that had an extensive autonomy. The leader of the Anjala conspiracy was Finnish-born Göran Magnus Sprengtporten, who had been exiled to Russia earlier because of his separatist ideas and eagerness concerning Finnish matters. Later on, the Russians exploited his expertise on matters concerning Finland. For example, he designed the Russian strategy for the Swedish-Russian war, and in 1808-9, he was able to promote matters concerning Finland when he participated in organizing Finnish local administration (Tommila 18, 60).

The Background of the Russo-Swedish War of 1808-09

Even though the opinion of the educated Finns was an important factor in becoming part of Russia, world politics played an essential role in the annexation: in the early 19th century, the French emperor Napoleon I was busy conquering Europe. However, there was one major obstacle to his supremacy over the continent: Great Britain. Since he could not conquer Britain with arms, Napoleon decided to use an embargo. He reasoned that if Britain was economically isolated from the rest of Europe, it would soon fall into his hands. Accordingly, Napoleon declared a Continental Blockade against Britain in 1806. However, Britain had a few allies that Napoleon would have to persuade to abandon their ally and join France instead in order for the blockade to be successful (Zetterberg 361). Among these allies were Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal. After Napoleon´s troops had defeated the Russians in the Battle of Friedland, East Prussia, in June 1807, Russian emperor Alexander I was ready to negotiate with Napoleon (Tommila 8-9).

Alexander and Napoleon met in July 1807 on the river Niemen in Tilsit, East Prussia. They signed a peace treaty between France and Russia and drew up plans for how the rest of Britain´s allies could be persuaded to join the Blockade. Subsequently, all but one of Britain´s allies joined forces with Napoleon during the fall of 1808. This exception was Sweden. The king of Sweden, Gustav IV Adolf, hated Napoleon deeply, regarding him as the Beast of the Apocalypse (Zetterberg 361). However, it was essential for Napoleon to get Sweden to join the embargo, as the Swedish coast was an important trade route between Great Britain and the rest of Europe (Saarnia).

According to the Tilsit agreement, Russia should force Sweden to join the anti-British alliance. Alexander himself was not particularly interested in starting a war against Sweden. According to Jutikkala and Pirinen, he was more interested in an expansion towards the southwest, i.e. to the Balkans, and thought that hostilities with Great Britain could be a military risk and also economically ruinous (276). Thus he first tried to pressure Sweden to join the Blockade with intimidations and bluffs: some Russian troops were transferred to the Swedish-Russian border and musters were organized in St. Petersburg. In addition, rumors were circulated that Russia was preparing to undertake a large-scale military operation against Sweden. At first, Swedish king Gustav IV Adolf did not pay any attention to these military actions. But in December 1807, as the tense political situation still continued, the Swedes finally started to consider the possibility of a Russian attack, and they began to prepare for war (Zetterberg 362).

On February 17, 1808, Russia finally delivered an ultimatum to Sweden: if Sweden was still not willing to join the anti-British alliance, Russia would occupy Finland. If Sweden decided to join the Blockade, Russian troops would leave Finland (Zetterberg 362).

The Beginning of the Russo-Swedish War

As Sweden did not comply with the Russian ultimatum, on February 21, 1808, Russian troops crossed the eastern border of Sweden, not far from the present-day border between Russia and Finland, without a declaration of war. At first, Russia did not have the intention to conquer Finland; it was just fulfilling its duty as an ally of France. According to Frilund, the Russian commanders´ intention was to have a quick and decisive war. However, the Finnish terrain turned out to be a problem: it was impossible to move large armies because of the vast forests, and owing to the long distances between villages and towns, the battles had to be fought along the main roads (Frilund). The Russo-Swedish war was fought mainly on three fronts: in the Ostrobothnia province in Western Finland, the Savo province in Eastern Finland, and Turku archipelago and Åland Islands in Southwestern Finland (see map).

The armies differed enormously from each other: the Russians were professional soldiers, whereas the Swedish-Finnish army consisted mostly of amateurs, who did not have much military training or experience, as Sweden had last waged a war in 1788-90. Moreover, the average age of the troops was around forty years and many of them had families, which decreased their readiness to carry out daring operations. On the contrary, the Russians had had military training, they had a lot of military experience, and they had familiarized themselves with the modern military strategy in Central Europe during the Napoleonic wars. Their leaders also had a lot of experience in modern warfare, whereas the Swedish-Finnish leaders were aged and had an old-fashioned military strategy (Tommila 13-5).

The Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish-Finnish troops, General Wilhelm Mauritz Klingspor, was in Stockholm at the time of the Russian invasion. The Acting Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Karl Natanael af Klercker, ordered his troops to deploy around Hämeenlinna and start fighting there. However, when Klingspor returned to Finland on March 1, 1808, he ordered the troops to retreat further north to Ostrobothnia as a tactical maneuver. The retreat, which was at first controlled, soon became a panicky escape, and the Russians got vast areas of land without needing to fight (Zetterberg 363). Following this, Helsinki was invaded by the Russians on March 2 and Hämeenlinna on March 6. The Finnish capital at that time, Turku, was conquered on March 23. In fact, Turku had earlier been declared an open city, and the Russian conquest was like a triumphal procession: the Turku inhabitants welcomed them with waving flags and an orchestra (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 51). By the end of March, the whole of Southern Finland had been occupied by the Russians except for the Sveaborg fortress⁷. During the first two months of the war the Swedish-Finnish army did nothing but retreat towards the north.

Although the beginning of the war seemed rather miserable for the Swedes, it was actually part of their strategy. The initial plan was that the troops in both Southern Finland and Savo province would retreat towards Ostrobothnia. When the ice had melted on Pohjanlahti (Österbotten), the sea between Finland and Sweden, additional troops would arrive from Sweden. With these supplementary troops, the surrendered areas would be reconquered. The fortresses of Southern Finland, Sveaborg in Helsinki and Svartholm in Loviisa, played an important role in the military plan: they were to defend themselves against the enemy until the ice melted and Swedish reinforcements came. With the help of these reinforcements, the Swedish attack would start in the summer and the fortresses would support the attack (Frilund; Zetterberg 364).

Unfortunately for the Swedes, their plan did not come true: Svartholm, defended by 700 men, surrendered to the Russians on March 18, 1808, after a couple of bombardments that caused only minor casualties. But an even more paralyzing effect on the Swedish-Finnish troops was the capitulation of Sveaborg. Sveaborg, the "Gibraltar of the North", was the largest and strongest of all Swedish fortresses. As the main base for the armed forces stationed in Finland, Sveaborg was actually a "key" to the whole of Finland in military terms: whoever occupied the fortress had a clear advantage over the enemy operating in Finland. Because of its military importance, Sveaborg was defended by 7,000 soldiers and 734 artillery pieces, and was regarded as a fortification that was impossible to conquer. At its strongest, the besieging troops consisted of 6,500 soldiers and 59 artillery pieces (Frilund; Zetterberg 364-5).

On March 19, the Russians opened fire on the fort. The bombardment itself was harmless, but the panicking Swedish soldiers, totally isolated from the other Swedish-Finnish troops and not knowing the overall military situation, only responded to the bombardment with sporadic fire. In spite of the fact that there were no casualties, and there was enough food and ammunition, the commander of Sveaborg, C. O. Cronstedt, started to negotiate with the Russians. In the negotiations, it was agreed that Sveaborg would surrender on May 3 if no supplementary Swedish-Finnish troops came to their aid by that date. Sveaborg sent a request for help to Stockholm, but the Russians stalled the messengers so that the request did not reach Stockholm until May 3. Thus the fortification surrendered. The reason for this unpredictable surrender was Russian bribes and unfounded rumors, spread by the Russians, about the bad success of the Swedish-Finnish troops that shattered the morale of defenders (Frilund; Zetterberg 365; Tommila 21).

The Swedish Summer Offensive and the Russian Counteroffensive

Meanwhile, the first real battle of the war was being fought in Siikajoki, Northern Ostrobothnia, on April 18, 1808. Swedish-Finnish troops led by General C. J. Adlercreutz clearly outnumbered the Russians and won the battle. A week later, Swedish-Finnish troops beat the Russians in Revonlahti. These two victories were psychologically important and portended a change in the course of the war (Zetterberg 364).

In June, the Swedish-Finnish troops began a great offensive in Ostrobothnia and in Savo, despite the fact that the Swedish landings in Lemu and Vaasa had been repelled by the Russians. In Ostrobothnia, the Swedish-Finnish army gained more victories, as the Russians were tied up preventing the Swedish landings on the western coast of Finland: the battle of Lapua on July 14 ended in Swedish victory as well as the battles of Kauhajoki on August 10 and Alavus on August 17. However, as the strategy of the Swedish leaders was old-fashioned, they could not take the advantage of the overwhelming victory in Lapua. Instead, they stopped their offensive for one month. In Savo, the Swedish-Finnish troops had conquered Kuopio at the beginning of May and they fought in the Kuopio-Toivala region the whole summer. In addition to the "official" victories of the Swedish-Finnish army, there were a number of popular uprisings and guerilla-like operations in the provinces of Ostrobothnia, Savo, North Karelia, and the Åland Islands. These actions caused difficulties for the Russian troops; later they were one of the reasons why Alexander gave Finland its special political status (Frilund; Jutikkala and Pirinen 280; Tommila 21). Owing to these adversities, the Russians had increase the number of its soldiers in Finland (Soikkanen).

Because of the Russian reinforcements in both Ostrobothnia and Savo in August 1808, the Swedish offensive came to an end. At the beginning of the war, both parties had been almost equal in size: there had been 24,000 Russian soldiers and 22,000 Swedish-Finnish soldiers on Finnish soil. However, by the end of August, the Russian troops comprised 47,500 men, whereas the Swedish-Finnish troops had only 25,600 men (Jutikkala and Pirinen 282; Tommila 22).

The Swedish-Finnish army had to start retreating again. In Ostrobothnia, they were defeated in Karstula on August 21, in Ruona on August 31 and in Salmi on September 1-2. On September 14, there was a disastrous fight for the Swedish-Finnish troops in Oravainen on the west coast near Vaasa: they lost over 700 men of around 6,000, and after this catastrophe the troops did not have much morale left (Zetterberg 367). However, the Swedish-Finnish troops got one more victory in Koljonvirta in Savo province on October 27. The Swedish-Finnish troops were clearly outnumbered by the Russians, 1,200 against 7,000, but the victory was the most impressive one the Swedish army gained during the whole war (Sauri 53). It was also the last victory the Swedish army ever gained on Finnish soil (Frilund). After the victory, both the western and the eastern army had to continue their retreat towards Oulu.

On November 19, 1808, Sweden and Russia signed a truce. According to the agreement, the Swedish-Finnish troops were allowed to retreat over the Kemijoki River to Swedish soil. By December 13, 1808 all the troops had left Finland. Still, the war was not yet over. The final capitulation treaty was not signed by the Swedish-Finnish army until on March 25, 1809, after the Russians had invaded the Åland Islands and crossed the frozen Pohjanlahti, heading for Umeå (Uumaja) on Swedish soil.

Map illustrating the most important phases of the Russo-Swedish war on Finnish soil. The Swedish retreat in February-April 1808 is marked by the red line. The line in light green indicates the Swedish offensive during the summer of 1808, whereas the broken line in red marks the Russian counteroffensive in the autumn of 1808. Source: Zetterberg 368.

Finland´s Annexation to Russia

Russia had not started the war with the intention of conquering Finland. At the end of March 1808, however, Russia changed its policy and let the other European powers know that it had not just occupied Finland; rather, it had annexed the area. As Jutikkala and Pirinen suggest, the most probable reason for this change was Alexander´s realization that Napoleon would not tolerate Russian penetration to the Balkans; therefore Russia had to expand in the north (285). Territorial expansion was important for Alexander and Russia, as Napoleon had increased his power by occupying Spain: Alexander felt that this occupation had to be compensated (Zetterberg 368). Other reasons were that Gustav IV Adolf had ordered that the Russian ambassador to Stockholm be imprisoned, and also that it would be easier for the Russians to prevent any Finnish revolts that might be instigated by the Swedish king if the Finns were under Russian command (Zetterberg 368; Jutikkala and Pirinen 285).

Soon after the annexation, Russia started to organize Finnish local administration. Thanks to Swedish rule, the foundation of administration already existed in the form of provinces, governors, and provincial governments (Zetterberg 368). The conqueror also realized the importance of appeasing the conquered: especially the peasantry and common people were suspicious of the Russians. They had heard about Russian serfdom⁸, and their previous experiences with Russians had been negative, limited to Russian campaigns on Finnish soil. As mentioned before, the attitude of the nobility towards the Russians had changed in the 18th century because of the ideas of the Enlightenment and the Swedish ignorance towards strengthening the defense of Finland that had continued for decades (Junnila 11).

The nobility also found Gustav IV Adolf inconsistent and stubborn. They thought it was very unwise to stay in alliance with the British while the Franco-Russian alliance was enjoying such impressive military success. The Finnish nobility was also fascinated by the opportunities to advance in one´s career that the great empire offered them. Sweden, on the contrary, was a small country, and did not provide many opportunities (Klinge 15). In addition, the clergy looked kindly upon the Russians. As it happened, the clergy had a tremendous influence on the common people, who then became more co-operative with the Russians. In order to further appease the peasantry, the Russians prevented the pillaging of civilian property and other problems that had occurred during their previous campaigns on Finnish soil (Junnila 12).

An important part of the Russians´ policy of appeasement was requiring an oath of loyalty from the Finns, both common people and officials. After the Finns had taken the oath, they could be treated and punished as other Russians (Zetterberg 368). The Russians started these oath-taking ceremonies in Turku at the end May 1808. But during the summer, as the Swedish-Finnish troops advanced and the landing of Swedish reinforcements was expected, common people in Turku and Vaasa provinces were reluctant to take the oath (Junnila 14). Some people were taken for questioning, and some were even imprisoned (Zetterberg 368). As long as there was some uncertainty about the result of the war, not taking the oath was seen as a clear support for Swedish rule. Even a minor stream of migration to Sweden started (Junnila 15).

The First Steps Toward Finnish Autonomy

During the spring of 1808, Alexander considered Finland´s future position in his empire. It is known that at first Alexander considered joining Finland to Russia as a governmental district, as had been the case with the area around Viborg that Russia had taken from Sweden in 1721 and 1743. However, there were several factors that made the emperor change his mind and give Finland a special political status. First of all, the political situation had become tenser in Europe; Russia was about to get involved in a war against Napoleon. Remembering the Finns´ courageous fighting and guerrilla actions during the war, Alexander thought it was essential to keep the Finns satisfied so that there would be no troubles near the Russian capital. In addition, Sweden was always a threat; it might try to persuade the Finns to join it again. That was why Alexander had to make it more tempting for the Finns to stay in the Russian empire. He thought that some special rights and privileges for the Finns might help in this situation. But Alexander was also a liberal monarch. He was interested in carrying out administrative experiments, for which Finland offered an excellent opportunity. The constitutional Gustavian laws⁹ of Sweden (the Form of Government of 1772 and the Act of Union and Security of 1789), which were also valid in Finland, gave the sovereign extensive prerogatives. Consequently, Alexander would not lose much of his autocratic power in Finland even if he recognized the validity of the Finnish constitutional laws (Junnila 19).

Finland getting its own administration and laws was not exceptional in the Russian empire. Poland and Bessarabia also had their own administrations. This was possible because at the beginning of the 19th century Russia was neither a national state nor a country with a homogenous administration but a loose group of nations led by an autocrat. In fact, Alexander called himself "the father of several nations" and "the head of the family formed by the Russian nations." In other words, Russia did not have any kind of government or parliament that would have unified the administration. In fact, the liberal Alexander had founded the first ministries in Russia in 1802. Russians were also forced to maintain the local administration systems, as they did not have enough well-educated officials in the country. That is why the Russians had to resort to hiring the officials among the population of the conquered areas. These local officials did not know any other kind of administration system than their own. As a consequence, local administration systems could differ from one place to another quite radically (Pulma 375; Tommila 53; Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 32, 775, 793).

On June 17, 1808, Alexander issued a manifest in which the position of Finland was defined in more detail than in the annexation proclamation given in March: Russia promised to maintain the old laws and rights of Finland. In the summer 1808, the emperor also proclaimed that he wanted a special deputation from Finland to tell him about the Finns´ needs and hopes. The deputation was to consist of men representing the four estates¹⁰ and different provinces of Finland. These men should be good public performers and have a positive attitude towards the Russian rule. Before the arrival of the deputation, Alexander met Napoleon again, in Erfurt. Alexander got Napoleon´s assent that he could keep Finland and do whatever he wanted with it. The deputation arrived in St. Petersburg at the end of October 1808. Its work involved preparing memorandums and getting acquainted with Russian governmental circles. The deputation also made it clear to the emperor that it did not consider itself as a representation of the Finnish estates; the estates should therefore be convened to a diet to discuss the important matters concerning the future position of Finland (Junnila 17-8; Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 793).

In December 1808, Alexander appointed G. M. Sprengtporten as the first General Governor of Finland, the highest official in Finland, and proclaimed that matters concerning Finland were to be reported directly to him. When the Finnish deputation finished its work on January 19, 1809, the emperor announced that a diet would be convoked in Porvoo at the end of March 1809 to discuss the matters that the deputation had refused to discuss (Junnila 18-9). When the deputation was still in St. Petersburg, the emperor assumed the title Grand Duke of Finland. It was common for the Russian emperors to adopt the former sovereign´s title when conquering new areas and thus increase their power (Jussila, Duchy 9; Suuriruhtinaskunta 28).

The Diet of Porvoo and Its Meaning

The Diet of Porvoo¹¹ was opened on March 25, 1808, despite the fact that the Russo-Swedish war was still raging. The diet was organized after the Swedish model since the Russians, who had an autocratic tradition instead of the Western-like constitutionality, did not have any experience in organizing such events (Junnila 19; Soikkanen).

Alexander arrived in Porvoo on March 27. Two days later, in Porvoo Cathedral, Alexander gave the estates his solemn assurance of sovereign in which he said:

...Providence having placed Us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have desired hereby to confirm and ratify the Religion and the Fundamental Laws of the Land as well as the privileges and rights which each class in the said Grand Duchy in particular, and all the inhabitants in general, be their position high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to the Constitution. We promise to maintain all these benefits and laws firm and unshakeable in their full force. (Kruhse)

After hearing this assurance, the estates, respectively, gave their oaths of allegiance¹² to their Grand Duke. The oath of allegiance that the estates had once given to Gustav IV Adolf no longer obligated them, as the king had been imprisoned and toppled by a coup d´etat only a couple of weeks earlier, due to the bad military success in Finland and the continuing alliance with Great Britain. So the estates were free to do as they wanted, and they wanted to join Russia (Zetterberg 371).

In the modern sense of the word, the Diet of Porvoo was not democratic. The oligarchic nature of the diet shows in the number of representatives of the estates: the nobility had 70 representatives at the highest, the clergy had eight, the bourgeoisie 19 and the peasantry 30. The diet did not make any decisions; it just gave advice on matters concerning Finland. Moreover, the estates were unable to decide on the matters they were going to discuss on the diet: they were only able to discuss the matters that the emperor had asked them to discuss. At the Diet of Porvoo, the estates discussed taxation, military forces, financial matters and the foundation of a government council (Junnila 19-20).

For the Finns, one of the most important things about the Diet of Porvoo was Alexander renewing his promise to maintain the laws, the privileges of the estates, the languages, and the religion that the Finns had had under Swedish rule. This meant, for example, that the official governmental system of Finland would remain a constitutional monarchy even if Russia was an autocracy, and that the Finnish laws could only be changed according to the statutes of the law. The diet made several suggestions that the emperor later on made laws: the tax revenues collected from the Finns were to be used in Finland, not in Russia; and there was to be a government council (a kind of "home government") and different kinds of administrative organs, among them a state bank. In addition, there would be a customs border between Finland and Russia, and Russian citizens would have no civil rights in Finland. The Finns also maintained the Swedish currency as a valid monetary unit along with the Russian ruble (Junnila 22; Zetterberg 372). Actually, the Diet had decided to adopt the Russian ruble as the only valid currency in Finland. The main obstacle was, however, the Finnish trade relations with Russia and Sweden: as the Finnish-Russian trade was mainly import trade and the Finnish-Swedish trade export trade, the Finns simply did not have enough rubles to undertake the change (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 151).

One major problem with Alexander´s solemn assurance of sovereignty was that he never specified which laws he was referring to. Some eminent Finns had suggested that Finland have new laws of its own, but the emperor did not agree with that proposal. The Finns themselves understood the situation as being that the emperor had promised to maintain the Gustavian constitutional laws. However, it was not easy to apply these laws in the Grand Duchy. Originally, the laws had been in force in the whole of the Swedish kingdom, which meant that they had been devised for an independent nation. In addition, there were numerous discrepancies between the laws and the conditions in which they were applied: for example, the laws had such terms as "the king" and "the kingdom of Sweden", and according to the laws the sovereign should have professed the Lutheran faith (the Russian emperor was a Greek Catholic). Furthermore, the laws imposed on the sovereign´s travels and succession to the throne were invalid. From the Russian point of view, the emperor was an ultimate autocrat. Therefore it was unnecessary to specify any particular laws; it would only have bound the emperor´s hands. Moreover, the emperor´s decision to give Finland an autonomous status was another privilege for the Finns. But as an autocrat, the emperor could take away this privilege whenever he wished. This actually happened in 1899, but at that time the autonomous position of their country had become self-evident for the Finns, and they fought fiercely for their rights (Junnila 19, 22-3).

Although Finland now had its own legislation and administration, it had two major differences in comparison with an independent nation: it lacked foreign and defense policies, and an autocratic emperor had supreme power over its legislation. As for the foreign and defense policies, Finland conformed to the Russian regulations. The Russians took care of Finnish foreign policy, and Russia had the right to station troops in Finland — either temporarily or for a longer period, depending on Russian interests. As a consequence, the Diet only discussed matters that concerned the relations of the Finnish people and Russia, as represented by the Grand Duke (Junnila 23).

The Diet of Porvoo ended on July 19, 1809. In a closing speech, Alexander declared that Finland had been "promoted to a nation among nations" (Eduskunta). According to Alexander, this meant that Finland had been given "a political existence". From the 1880s till today, several historians have disputed what actually was promised at the Diet of Porvoo. Was it the birth of the Finnish national state or not? What did the emperor actually mean when he spoke about "constitution" and "nation"¹³? Were the laws of Finland supposed to be followed by the emperor, or was the emperor above the law (Soikkanen)?

As for public reactions to the Diet, one should bear in mind that posterity has considered the Diet of Porvoo to be a more significant event than its contemporaries did. This is because the major part of the occasion´s significance originated in the 1860s and afterwards, when the Finnish national identity became clearer (Tommila 49). For example, the only newspaper in Finland at that time did not report anything on the convention in Porvoo, but instead had articles on American Indians (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 77)!

For Alexander, the Diet had, among other things, an immense propaganda value: in Western and Central Europe, autocratic Russia was considered to be tyrannical. Now the Finns had voluntarily created good relationships with the Russians and were their satisfied subjects. In particular, Alexander was eager to inform Napoleon about the success of the Finnish Diet, for the French emperor had failed to appease the regions and peoples he had conquered. The peoples were not satisfied with French supremacy; for example, Napoleon had serious problems with Spain, which he had conquered a little earlier than Alexander had conquered Finland (Junnila 24). Therefore the success of the Finnish Diet was part of the mental warfare between the two most powerful political figures in Europe at that time.

The Foundation of Central Administration and Official Separation from Sweden

The development of the Finnish central administration system started soon after the Diet had ended. The primary reason for creating an efficient administration system in Finland was that the Russian empire was huge. The sovereign, although he and only he had supreme administrative authority in Finland, did not have as much time as the Swedish ruler had had to take care of matters concerning his realm (Junnila 30).

In August 1809, the Governmental Council was established, as it had been decided during the Diet of Porvoo. The Governmental Council was the Grand Duke´s regency in Finland; it was totally dependent on the autocrat. All the decisions were made in the Grand Duke´s name. The Council consisted of fourteen members, who were Finns by birth. Half of them were noblemen, half commoners. The Grand Duke appointed the members for a three-year term. The Governmental Council was divided in two sections: the financial department and the legal department. The legal department was also the Supreme Court of Finland, so the legislative and jurisdictional powers were not separate from each other. The chair of the Governmental Council was the General Governor of Finland.

The General Governor was the highest administrative and governmental authority in Finland during the autonomy. In addition to being the chair of the Governmental Council, he was also the commander of the Russian troops stationed in Finland. Actually, the General Governor practically never attended the meetings since they were held in Swedish, which the General Governor, being Russian, did not understand. Therefore the position of the vice chair became more important; since the 1820s it was considered to be a sort of prime minister. The Council also had a procurator that was a subordinate of the General Governor and responsible for the legitimacy of the Council. The name of the Council was changed to the Imperial Senate of Finland by the manifesto of the Grand Duke in 1816 (Junnila 30; Jutikkala and Pirinen 292-4).

It is noteworthy that Russia had made all these efforts to create a separate administration system for Finland despite the fact that the Russo-Swedish War was still raging and there was no official treaty saying that Finland had been separated from Sweden and was now a part of Russia. In the late summer of 1809, Russia offered to make peace with Sweden; as an ally of Napoleon, Russia had descended into a new war, against Austria, and it needed more troops on that front (Junnila 26). Consequently, the Russo-Swedish War ended in the Peace of Hamina (Fredrikshamn) on September 17, 1809. In the peace Sweden ceded the eastern part of the kingdom to Russia, including the Åland Islands with its Swedish-speaking population (also known as Österland), and the eastern part of Norrland (Lapland and Ostrobothnia) (see map).

The possession of the Åland Islands was strategically important: the sea near them was open almost all winter, which made Russian hegemony over the Baltic Sea possible (Klinge 17). It is also important to notice that Finland was not incorporated to Russia as "Finland" but as a group of six provinces (Soikkanen). The peace was devastating for Sweden; it lost one third of its surface area (Junnila 27). Klinge emphasizes that the border dividing Sweden and Russia (or Sweden and Finland) could have been drawn up another way as well. It was the strategic interests of the empire that determined which areas Russia annexed to itself: Finland was to be the military outpost of Russia; it was to play an important role in the defense plan of St. Petersburg. A good indication of this military role is that the primary responsibility of the General Governor was to be the chief of the Russian troops stationed in Finland. He was also responsible for the military district as a whole (31). The boundary drawn up in the Peace of Hamina, following the Muonionjoki and Tornionjoki Rivers, is still the present-day Finnish-Swedish border.

A Change in the Swedish Policy and New Reforms in Finland

Although Finland was now officially part of Russia, Sweden still had intentions of reconquering Finland whenever there was a suitable time. But once again, world politics affected the fate of Finland: in early 1812, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, a French Marshall who had been elected the sovereign of Sweden in 1810, proposed to Alexander that Russia and Sweden join their forces against Napoleon. In April 1812, the two sovereigns concluded a secret contract. Russia promised to help Sweden conquer Norway from Denmark, and Sweden abandoned all its plans to reconquer Finland. At the same time, Sweden pledged to participate in the war against Napoleon. The two sovereigns met each other in Turku in August 1812 after Napoleon had attacked Russia. By that time, it was obvious for the Finns that it would be impossible to rejoin Sweden, so they had to start thinking about their future as a part of the Russian empire (Pulma 388-9; Junnila 44-5).

In the meantime, the establishment of the Finnish central administration system proceeded relatively quickly: the Stamped Paper Bureau was established in 1810, followed by the Collegium Medicum (the National Board of Medicine) in 1811, the Exchange, Loan and Deposition Bureau (nowadays Bank of Finland) in 1812, and Board of Customs in 1812, among other boards. The Grand Duke also granted other reforms and privileges: several taxes were abolished, and the army was disbanded for fifty years (the position of Finland as part of the large Russian empire was more secure than it had been under Swedish rule, thus there was no need for a Finnish army). Shopkeepers were freed from the Swedish monopoly or even the obligation to trade primarily with Sweden. The only university in Finland, situated in Turku, was given new funds and posts. The nobility and army officers were granted privileges that would never have been possible for Sweden to give: high-ranking honors, decorations, pensions, and pay increases were so lavishly distributed on each imperial visit to Finland that it even aroused envy in Sweden (Jussila, Duchy 24-5).

In 1811, the Committee for Finnish Affairs was founded in St. Petersburg and worked there until its abolition in 1826. The task of this committee was to prepare and present civil administration affairs concerning Finland to Alexander in person. The committee itself had no discretion. It only consisted of Finnish citizens. The chair of the committee was Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, former Swedish diplomat and a close friend of Swedish king Gustav III, the father of Gustav IV Adolf. In 1811, he returned to his mother country Finland and immediately became the great favorite of Alexander. The favorites of the emperor had such an immense power in the Russian empire that it is not exaggerated to say that the Russian empire was largely based on this "favorite power". So, Armfelt had a great influence in matters concerning not only Finland but the whole the Russian empire. And, as Armfelt became the favorite of Alexander, Finland became one of his favorite areas in the empire. Armfelt wanted to reinforce the Finnish autonomy; for example, the foundation the Committee for Finnish Affairs was completely down to him. He also wanted the Finns to become aware of their special position in the Russian empire, because, in his opinion, it was the only way maintain this special position (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 120-2; Tommila 92, 94, 96).

Armfelt also had an impact in the unification of Old Finland and the recently conquered New (Swedish) Finland in 1812. Old Finland comprised the areas that Sweden had ceded to Russia in the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 and in the Treaty of Åbo (Turku) in 1743. After the annexation to Russia, these areas had degenerated. The Russians found the Swedish administration system better than theirs, and they decided to try out different administrative models in order to make the administration of the whole empire more modern and western. As a consequence of this unification, the population of Finland rose to over a million for the first time in history. The unification had also economic and ideological consequences: Eastern Finland started to develop, as it was near the Russian capital, and the international atmosphere of Viborg affected the whole of Finland (Palmu 384-7).

The Grand Duchy of Finland after the unification of New (Swedish) Finland and Old Finland (the gray area). Ostrobothnia and Lapland had become part of Finland in the Treaty of Hamina in 1809. Source: Jussila, Duchy 2

Finnish Autonomy from 1812 Onwards

In 1812, the Grand Duke also made another important reform in Finland. The capital of Finland at that time, Turku, was too remote and far away from St. Petersburg. In addition, Turku had close economic and political relations with Sweden, which might cause trouble. Therefore Finland should have a new capital. An appropriate candidate was found on the southern coast of Finland: Helsinki. This small town was sheltered by the strong fortification of Sveaborg. Moreover, one third of the town had been destroyed by fire in 1808, so it had to be rebuilt. Therefore it was easy to create a new imperial-like capital for Finland. The task was entrusted to the German architect C. L. Engel. Between 1816 and 1841 thirty new public buildings were built. In the year 1819 the building project was already sufficently advanced that the Senate moved from Turku to Helsinki (Palmu 387-8).

Thanks to all these reforms, the "official" boundary dividing Finland and Russia was evident in everyday life: if one crossed the Finnish-Russian border, one noticed that the title of the sovereign was no longer Emperor of Russia but Grand Duke of Finland, the autocratic form of government had been replaced by constitutionality, and the nationality of the people was Finnish, not Russian. On crossing the border, the official language also changed from Russian to Swedish and Finnish. Later on, even the date changed, as the Viborg province had adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1819¹⁴ (Junnila 55).

As mentioned previously, the reforms in Finland after the year 1808 were mostly due to the international relations in Europe. Consequently, the political change in Europe in 1815 was also reflected in Finland. Napoleon had been defeated, and the political situation in Europe had stabilized. Russia had become the leading power in Europe; it no longer needed to continue its policy of appeasement in Finland or other border districts. In addition, Alexander had problems with the Poles, to whom he had granted a position similar to that of Finland; there had been separatist tendencies in Poland, and Alexander regretted the privilege he had granted for the area (Pulma 389-90). Alexander also renounced the liberal ideas of his youth that were based on the ideas of the Enlightenment and included, for example, administrative experiments (Tommila 143).

So, after the year 1819 there were hardly any reforms until the mid-1850s, when radical reforms were made to modernize the country. The reforms after the mid-1850s also created the foundation of present-day Finland: for example, in the 1860s, Finland got a currency of its own and Finnish became an official language of the country. The Diet started to convene regularly in 1863, which was its first convention after 1809. In 1906, Finns were granted universal suffrage, and the most modern parliament in Europe replaced the convention of the estates that went back to the 17th century (Eduskunta). According to Jussila, in the early 20th century, Finland was the only area in the Russian empire that had a separate administration despite the fact that the Russians tried to deprive the Finns of their privileges from 1899 until Finnish independence in 1917 (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta, 693). On the contrary, if Finland had stayed part of Sweden in 1809, it would have been very unlikely to become an independent nation. Instead, it would soon have become totally Swedish (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 793).

The Reasons for Finnish Autonomy

Finland was annexed to Russia as a consequence of the Russo-Swedish war that the Russian emperor Alexander had started in order to pressure Sweden to join the Continental Blockade imposed by Napoleon. Signs of this annexation had already been visible in the 18th century when the Russian empire had gained political and military power.

The annexation of Finland to the Russian empire with its own administrative system (autonomy) was not out of the ordinary, as in 1809 Russia was only a loose group of nations led by an autocrat. Local administrative systems varied radically, as there were not enough Russian officials to take care of administrative duties throughout the empire. Therefore, in organizing administration, the Russians had to resort to local officials, who were only acquainted with the administrative model practiced in their area. In addition, autocratic Russia did not have a parliament to unify the overall administrative structure.

Because of the huge size of the Russian empire, it was essential to create a central administration system in Finland as well. Under Swedish rule, Finland had been regarded as an integral part of Sweden; all the decisions concerning Finland were made in Stockholm and there was simply no need for a separate Finnish central administration system.

Finland was situated near the Russian capital of St. Petersburg, and it was essential that the Finns would not engage in a guerrilla war against the Russians in the unstable political situation of the time, which was caused by the Napoleonic wars. The Finns had carried out guerrilla-like operations during the Swedish-Russian war of 1808-9. That is why it was important to keep the Finns satisfied. The Russian policy of appeasement towards the Finns contained, for example, the highly ceremonial Diet of Porvoo in 1809, the task of which was to give advice on matters concerning Finland to the ruler.

The personality of the Russian emperor also played an integral part in the creation of the Finnish autonomy. Alexander I was a liberal monarch, raised according to the ideas of the Enlightenment, and interested in carrying out administrative experiments. He also had personal favorites who had an enormous influence throughout the Russian empire. Among his favorites were the Finnish-born G. M. Sprengtporten and G. M. Armfelt, who were influential in reinforcing Finnish autonomy.

The new autonomous status of Finland was thus due to the political situation in Europe in the early 19th century, the Russian autocratic administrative system, the liberal political ideas of emperor Alexander I, and the influence of his Finnish-born personal favorites.

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Notes

1. To find out more about the topic, see The First Centuries of Christianity in Finland (Järvinen, 2005). (back)

2. In the Middle Ages, the inhabited areas in Finland were called Österland (Eastland). In the 17th century, the name Österland was changed to "Finland and Ostrobothnia". After the Lesser Wrath the predominant name for the area was "Finland". One should bear in mind that before the Peace of Hamina the name "Finland" stood only for the southern parts of the present-day Finland and did not include Lapland (Österland). (back)
   
   

   Sweden was historically divided into four lands, of which Österland was also known as Finland. This map depicts the Swedish borders in the year 1700. Source: Österland

3. Throughout the Middle Ages, the Swedes elected their king. The electorate consisted of "lawmen" (in Swedish "lagman"), who were yeomen from different Swedish provinces, and the representatives of the Church (Jutikkala and Pirinen 71). (back)

4. In this chapter, I am using the term "Finns" to describe the population of the eastern parts of Sweden. (back)

5. The Hats were a political party in Sweden during the Age of Liberty (1719-1772). The party was named after three-cornered hats worn by officers and gentlemen at that time. The three-cornered hats were regarded as symbolizing courage and boldness. The primary rivals of the Hats party were the Caps, named after night-caps because of their softness and cowardice. Caps were pro-Russian, whereas Hats were pro-French (Mäntylä 292-3). (back)

6. As to this seemingly surprising attitude, one should take into account that people at that time found this kind of cosmopolitanism natural, because the concept of nationalism was still unknown. Nationalism was only promoted later by the Romanticism of the early 19th century, right after the Enlightenment. (back)

7. Sveaborg ("The Fortress of Sweden") is nowadays known as Suomenlinna ("The Castle of Finland"). It was built in the 18th century to protect the whole of Finland. Today, it is one of the most popular tourist attractions in Helsinki. In 1991, it was included on the UNESCO World Heritage List as a unique monument of military architecture (Suomenlinna). (back)

8. Sweden never had a serfdom system. The difference between the peasants and the serfs was that the peasants were free men and could move from one place to another if they wished. On the contrary, the serfs were bound to land and thus they had no right to move. In addition, they had to pay dues and rents to their lords and do statutory labor. They also needed their lords´ permission to get married. Officially serfs were not slaves; they were not sold or bought, as the Christian church had forbidden the slavery of Christians. In Eastern Europe the serfdom system was even stricter than in Western Europe. Russia finally abolished serfdom in 1861. (back)

9. Sweden abrogated the Gustavian laws (the Form of Government of 1772 and the Act of Union and Security of 1789) soon after Gustav IV Adolf was toppled in 1809. In Finland, on the contrary, they continued to be valid laws — though old-fashioned ones — until 1919 (Junnila 22; Jutikkala and Pirinen 289). (back)

10. Unlike for example in France, there were indeed four estates in the 18th century Sweden: the nobility, the clergy, the bourgeoisie, and the peasants. (back)

11. In fact, the name of the occasion was at that time the Estates Convention; the term The Diet of Porvoo was adopted later on (Eduskunta). (back)

12. This oath of allegiance or fealty was based on the medieval and feudalistic concept of power, according to which there were two spheres, that of the sovereign and his government that had executive and judicial power; and that of the subjects and estates, with their privileges and rights that the sovereign could not change even if he wished. So, when an area or a country was conquered, its new sovereign and his new subjects made a "status contract" to maintain the prevailing conditions in the area. This was done by taking an oath in which the sovereign promised to maintain the privileges and rights of his subjects and the subjects swore that they would be loyal to their new ruler. The most famous example of a "contract" of this kind is the English Magna Charta (1215). All the European sovereigns had always promised to maintain the local laws, privileges, and religions, Napoleon being the first to break this unwritten "law". This feudalistic tradition gradually eroded from the French Revolution of 1789 onwards, but was still practiced in Europe until 1848 (Jussila, Suuriruhtinaskunta 30, 37). (back)

13. At the time of the Porvoo Diet these terms were vaguely defined and did not necessarily have the same meanings as nowadays: "Constitution" not only had its present-day meaning, but also could mean all the laws that were already in force. "Nation" could mean all the people that lived in the same country, or the people who could decide upon its fate, or an independent nation that had its own country. (back)

14. Unlike most Western and Central European countries, Russia used the Julian calendar, which was at that time 12 days behind the Gregorian calender, which had been introduced in Finland in 1753 (Wikipedia). (back)

Works Cited:

• Eduskunnan historia. The official webpage of the Finnish Parliament. Last viewed: November 10, 2005
• Frilund, Göran. The Final War. The Swedish-Russian war of 1808-1809. Frilund´s personal website. Last viewed: November 23, 2005
• Gregorian calendar. Last modified August 27, 2005.
• Isoviha ja pikkuviha. The official webpage of Helsinki City Museum. Last viewed: November 10, 2005
• Junnila, Olavi. Autonomian rakentamisen ja kansallisen nousun aika. Suomen historia. Ed. Paula Avikainen and Erkki Pärssinen. Espoo, Finland: Amer-yhtymä Oy Weilin+Göösin kirjapaino, 1986. 11-55
• Jussila, Osmo. Finland as a Grand Duchy, 1809-1917. From Grand Duchy to a Modern State. A Political History of Finland since 1809. Trans. David and Eva-Kaisa Arter. Malaysia: Hurst & Company Ltd., 1999. 3-37
• - - - . Suomen suuriruhtinaskunta 1809-1917. Juva, Finland: WS Bookwell Oy, 2004.
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• Katajala, Jussi. Feodalismi. Katajala´s personal website. Last viewed: November 9, 2005
• Klinge, Matti. Keisarin Suomi. Trans. Marketta Klinge. Helsinki: Painotalo Miktor, 1997
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• Österland. Wikipedia. Last modified November 16, 2005.
• Pulma, Panu. Rauhoituspolitiikan kausi. Suomen historian pikkujättiläinen. Ed. Seppo Zetterberg. Porvoo, Finland: WS Bookwell Oy, 2003. 373-88
• Saarniaho, Rami. Suomen sota 1808.09 ja autonomian synty. Saarniaho´s personal website. Last viewed: August 22, 2005
• Sauri, Seppo. Suomalaisten suuret taistelut. Keuruu, Finland: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy, 2nd edition, 2002.
• Soikkanen, Timo. Soikkanen 24.1. luento Autonomia.doc. Faculty of Social Sciences, Turku University. Last viewed: September 6, 2005
• Suomenlinna. Official webpage maintained by the Governing Body of Suomenlinna. Last viewed August 26, 2005
• Tommila, Päiviö. Suomen autonomian synty 1808-1809. Helsinki: Valtion painatuskeskus, 1984
• Vahtola, Jouko. Keskiaika. Suomen historian pikkujättiläinen. Ed. Seppo Zetterberg. Porvoo, Finland: WS Bookwell Oy, 2003. 50-68, 88-9
• Zetterberg, Seppo. Suomen sota. Suomen historian pikkujättiläinen. Ed. Seppo Zetterberg. Porvoo, Finland: WS Bookwell Oy, 2003. 361-72

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Last Updated 22 April 2010