DISARMAMENT, STRIP-TEASE IN THE IDEOLOGICAL

"As are the papers, so are the readers; they, by irresistible sequence and association, believe that those people who constantly figure in the papers are cleverer, abler, or, at any rate, somewhat higher than other people."

(Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 1867)

1. War, Peace and Mass Communication

How are journalism and mass communication related to questions of war and peace, armament and disarmament, the peace movement? - Stuart Ewen describes the situation in the United States as follows:

...amidst (this) general dislocation, recent months have witnessed the re-emergence of a military nationalism, threatening to become the basis for a new-found unity. The panorama served up by the mass media is increasingly and variously oriented toward the possibility of war...1

Ewen's account dates back to 1980, just before the Reagan Administration came into office.

Ewen continues:

In our eyes, in our ears, in ours minds, the disparate images of mass culture rendezvous to create a coherent vision of incoherence. Both our experience and the general media panorama underwrite the need for some kind of unity, some kind of bond, and for some kind of resolution; some action, some re-integration that will settle the chaos. ...In multiplying the evidence of fragmentation, it also, now, begins to articulate the terms of assimilation into order. The terms are war, or - more precisely - authoritarianism: the moral economy of war. ...In life there is chaos; in authority, and on the editorial pages, there is order. ...A relation of power is reaffirmed in the structuring of information: coordination of those in power, fragmentation for the rest of us.2

For Ewen, the questions of war and peace are not merely questions of willing war or willing peace. Quite obviously, Ewen does not suggest that
the crux of the matter would lie in whether we have peace-promoting or war-promoting leaders: it is also the relationships between the state and civil society which are at stake. It is to do with social organization and the solidarity form of society; they are in Ewen's view, inclined to war when chaos accumulates and expands in civil society, chaos based on class and interest conflicts cutting across civil society. When conflicts cannot be resolved at the level of civil society, it is the state instances above society (authority; editorial pages) which assume the role of arbitrator of the chaos.

There are situations where this type of social order needs war (imaginary and/or actual war) in order to recover from its crises. We may refer to the Scandinavian submarine hunts or Britain's mission to the Falklands, for example.

The theory underlying Stuart Ewen's analysis resembles the theory on the ideological elaborated by Wolfgang F. Haug and Projekt Ideologie-Theorie (PIT). They start with the concept of ideological powers. The first ideological power is state. PIT follows Engels, who "...in departing from the genetic necessity of the state, conceives of it as the social power above and over society, i.e., as an alien social power." The prevailing genetic necessities are the social contradictions which cannot be resolved within the community, i.e. within the framework of 'horizontal' forms of people's interaction. From this standpoint, it is thus the social contradictions that underpin the strengthening of the moral economy of war which Ewen discovered in the United States and which Mrs. Thatcher took advantage of in Britain.

What, then, does the formation and strengthening of the instance of state mean? According to PIT, the competences constituting and supporting society, competences originally related to the 'horizontal' interaction between the members of the community, change place along with the emergence of the ideological powers, and become competences of suprasocial instances. Accordingly, the direction of the formation and maintenance of community becomes 'vertical', from above to below.

Now, it may be suggested that the army, as a power above and over society, also maintains, for its part, society as an ideological power from above to below. The army became an ideological power when it assumed responsibility for defence in society on behalf of the community. In the early stage of social development, the defence function was probably taken care of by the people itself as an armed force. In this connection, the use of weaponry and the co-ordinated action as an
armed force are relevant competences: and security, independence, sovereignty, etc., are the ideological values through which the army performs its function of ideological socialization.\textsuperscript{4}

Haug's and PIT's working definition of the ideological runs as follows: "The ideological is to be conceived of as ideal socialization from above".\textsuperscript{5}

But even the situation Ewen analysed is more complex than this working definition. It may well be that mass culture and the modern media panorama are part of the authoritarian moral economy of war and that they create chaos in life, but order and solutions at the level of those in power. This would mean socialization (Vergesellschaftung) from above to below through ideological powers. Had Ewen written his article two years later, he might have had to consider other elements of social organization than just the chaos of the media panorama and the authoritarian, war-promoting state order arising from the chaos – namely, the peace movement and other similar forms of organization. Ewen's analysis does not in fact explain how the peace movement can exist under the circumstances of the modern publicity drama. Is the peace movement organized completely outside the modern public sphere? Hardly.\textsuperscript{6} But what is it in the media panorama that makes the emergence of peace movements possible in the first place?

It remains unclear what Ewen means when he speaks about "the need for ... some action, some re-integration that will settle the chaos". In a sense, the authoritarian state power is an answer to such a need arising "from below". Ewen however casts more light onto how the instances above function from above to below than onto how they are constituted from below to above. Consequently, his view may disregard such potentials of resistance which already exist in the media panorama.\textsuperscript{7}

In effect, PIT too encountered similar problems when attempting to proceed from the critique of ideology theories to concrete analyses, namely to the analysis of the ideological in fascism.

According to Haug,\textsuperscript{8} it is not sufficient to approach things from the angle of ideological powers and subjection-effects in general. The concrete political struggles take place as if 'transversally' in relation to the general structure of ideological powers.

The ideological powers, working from above to below, provide so to speak merely the strings – the tuning and strumming as well as the concrete composition of the tones took place 'laterally' to these. Every political acteur had to play on these strings, had to attempt to change their tuning (and that means: their tension) to his advantage. Everyone had to
play his piece - if it was to be a piece of politics - on these strings. The social interests had to be articulated in political projects, and the political projects had to be articulated ideologically.  

Socialization-from-above does not take place through the 'official' channels of the ideological powers only. More important, Haug propounds, is the way in which the political acteurs place themselves, "from below", in relation to "God/King/Fatherland", or "Law & Order", or "Freedom and Reason", and so on. One of the results is the political and ideological "translation" of economic interests. An analysis of these translations, according to Haug, leads us to a better understanding of the genesis of the ideological powers.

A fundamental form of social struggles in the context of an established class differentiation can in Haug's view be understood as the antagonistic reclamation of community. Class differentiations of society are antagonistic by nature, and this antagonism decomposes unity. Antagonisms are not resolved as an immediate interest struggle. Instead, the community is restituted over again at the level of ideological values, i.e. by playing on the strings of the ideological. The antagonism remains in the ideological restitution of the community.

A new, stable power structure with the social axis of class antagonism can only develop if, laterally to this class structure, ideological powers are erected. In other words, the disintegration of community stabilizes itself through the ideological restitution of community.  

2. Starting with the Military Budget

Drawing on the theoretical framework above, we shall analyse the journalistic publicity which was brought about by a political conflict concerning the Finnish military budget. The period covered extends from spring 1982 to the turn of 1982/83. Our aim is to find out what it was that was created in the political struggle and its publicity. Moral economy of war or peace? ('Moral economy' roughly equals what Haug calls 'the solidarity form of community'.) Was it moral economy of war in the sense that the process results in producing and reproducing the state power over and above society, a state power which is also a military power and whose condition of existence is its capability to and inclination of war? Or was it moral economy of peace, i.e., control of civil society over the state as an armed power?

Most essential, here, is not what happened with the military budget itself and with the arms purchases; what we are concerned with is what kind of social organization the process produced. It is possible that arms build-up
accelerated while the ideological power of the state diminished. As for peace, then, the combined effect would be positive, since wars (imaginary and/or real) do not (this is our contention) break out so much out of arms but out of social organization.\textsuperscript{11} The balance of forces between the state and civil society depends, in turn, at least partly on how journalism articulates, organizes and brings up such political disputes as the one we are concerned with here.

This, then, also gives our analysis its meaning. We want to know (and others to know) what kind of social function normal journalistic activities perform, what they produce, a social order of war or peace, and how.

Our starting point lies in the "concrete political conflicts and processes" which, at the outset, are tuned 'horizontally', 'laterally' in relation to the 'vertical' direction of the general structure of the ideological. PIT illustrates this with the following figure.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 1. (Haug 1983, 13).

The figure is three-dimensional. At the horizontal level, the community disintegrates along the social division of labour and class antagonisms; and this gives rise to what Haug calls the antagonistic reclamation of community. These conflicts are 'resolved' in the vertical direction through the constitution of ideological powers.

But how do the social division of labour and class distinctions split society horizontally? Here, we must consider the class structure from the standpoint of journalism and mass
communication. It is often held that in mass communication we have emitters of messages (journalists, protagonists in news events, etc.) on the one hand, and a number of recipients (the audiences, the consumers of information services, etc.) on the other. Here we have one horizontal division.

The division seems to be related to one dimension of the class structure of modern society, namely to the dimension of managerial positions. In mass communication, it may be assumed that the managers are frequently 'emitters', non-managers usually 'recipients'. That is, mass communication could be conceived of as one interface between different class groups. Journalists, then, can be seen as a third category (at least for the purposes of this analysis). We have three groups: 1) those in top managerial positions, 2) journalists, 3) audiences in non-managerial positions. In PIT's three-dimensional figure, journalists and mass communication would be located at the origin of the coordinates as the mediator through which all the parties of the division are in contact with one another.

3. From Class Structure to Journalism

The starting point of our analysis is in the political debate concerning arms purchases for the armed forces and the publicity covering the debate. But the starting point of the publicity itself was and is - at least in some sense - in the class division into decision-makers ('doers' as Connell calls them) and others (those who are 'done by'). The dominant form of news discourse begins with the disintegration of community: 'them', the decision-makers (in military affairs) over there, and 'us', the ordinary people here; 'them' and 'us'.

Headlines of the news dispatches in newspapers frequently formulate the situation in this manner. The following headline from Helsingin Sanomat, is one of the stories that launched the public political campaign and may serve as an example:

**Hallitus sopi liisibudjetista:**

**Armeijalle aseita NL:sta 450 miljoonalla markalla**

Government agrees on supplementary budget:

450 million worth arms from the SU

The title tunes in a communication situation with a double address: first the journalist (with 'us') identifies the 'doer', i.e. the government, then - this is formally indicated with a colon by the journalist - the government ('them') speaks, announcing its decision.

Normally, journalism tunes in a great number of such differentiations
into insiders and outsiders a day. Every day, journalism witnesses the internal differentiation, even disintegration, of community. One interpretation of this might be that modern journalism has brought about a proliferation of points in society which can become loci of social antagonisms, that is, of the contradictory play of power/resistance. Laclau writes:

From the viewpoint of the traditional power blocs, this new situation has a name: a crisis of governability. From the viewpoint of the advance towards a democratic and socialist society in Europe, it has a different name: the construction of a new hegemony, one which is conceived as a differential articulation, not founded on the necessary centrality of any one sector, but which constructs a new popular historical subject.15

Here, Laclau in fact propounds the two main directions into which the conflict we are concerned with here (appropriation for new arms purchases) could be developed in journalism and mass communication (and these were the journalists’ options too): a) to overcome the crisis of governability, i.e. to restore the competence to govern to the traditional power bloc, b) to construct a new popular hegemony.

Let us formulate some hypotheses: In the concrete political conflict analysed here, the first direction (‘a’) could mean the moral economy of war. The crisis of governability, in this case actualized as a debate on armament and disarmament, would be overcome through ideological powers; the community would be reclaimed through ideological powers and values.

In the second direction (‘b’), moral economy of peace, new hegemony, could be constructed:

The unity of the hegemonic structure, in turn, may articulate itself as convergence in difference. The construction of this type of unity is not based on the exclusion of those questions which form the boundaries and of which disagreements arise either.16

This would evidently presuppose that journalism and mass communication articulate political conflicts many-sidedly, by bringing together various communities while duly respecting the communitarian character of them. The articulation should take place:

- between the fractions of the governing groups (e.g. conflicts between political parties)
- between forms of organization outside the traditional power bloc (social and cultural movements)
- between the governed and the governing groups, in both directions;
- between journalists and all the other groups.

Whether the journalistic publicity around the arms purchase dispute proceeded in the first or the second direction, it in any event took place “in a field of articulation of experiences, goals, etc., in a discursive network”.17

This network is what we are trying to
come to grips with in this study.

4. Dispute over the Arms Money

To begin with, we shall analyse the first phase of the political struggle over the proposed appropriation for arms purchases to be included in the supplementary budget in spring 1982, which was later approved. The issue entered the public sphere on April 20, 1982, and the first phase was over on June 23, 1982. We shall only discuss the public side of the political conflict as it appeared in Helsingin Sanomat.\textsuperscript{18}

We shall not compare the coverage of the news events with the 'events themselves'; our focus is on coverage as such. During the period mentioned, Helsingin Sanomat published 13 news reports on the dispute.

Dispute over the supplementary budget. - Behind the political conflict in question here is a more general social conflict; contradictions within the ideological itself.

As Haug puts it: "Ideological powers become powers - and they retain their position - only because they undertake ... to perform functions necessary for the whole of society ..."\textsuperscript{19}

One of the functions necessary for the whole of society is defence. The armed troops of the state are responsible for the defence of the entire society. By assuming this function, the armed forces may become an ideological power. On this basis, the following demand can be made: We must have armament! This was expressed by President Koivisto in his traditional New Year's speech (1.1.1983) as follows: "We (community in the ideological) must make our decisions concerning the defence budget on the grounds of our own interests with due account of the fact that the defence capability is maintained."

Yet, in practice, to perform the defence and security functions by weaponry has meant, and increasingly so in the nuclear age, that arms and arms build-up do not necessarily bring about more security. On the contrary, they bring about (a feeling of) insecurity, today even the possibility of complete desolation of the earth. As Pertti Joenniemi, quoting Jerome Wiesner, puts it: "the global deterrence has gone off in one's own camp ..."\textsuperscript{20} A similar motive may drive the peace movement in general: the security services of the state are seen as insecurity services. It is conceivable that all armament leads to counter-armament in other countries; counter-armament means less security resulting from one's own armament, and the improvement of quality and power of arms frequently results in less and less security which incites further armament, which, in turn ... A vicious circle of arms race. This aspect was
expressed by President Koivisto in an interview (18.5.1983) in the following way: "Arms build-up does not enhance international security; it jeopardizes it." Here we have another demand: We must have disarmament!

The conflict "We must have armament! / We must have disarmament!" intensified along with the growth and strengthening of the peace movement. But in the dispute at stake here it was not the contradictory ideological powers alone (values for and against armament), but journalism, too (as a technical faculty, producer of protagonists and audiences), that provided "so to speak ... the strings" so that "every political acteur had to play his piece - if it was to be a piece of politics - on these strings".

One political party, the People's Democratic League (PDL),\textsuperscript{21} represented in the coalition government at the time, took up to play a political piece. When the proposal to include the appropriation for the armed forces in the supplementary budget was published (21.4.1982), the PDL publicly took a stand against it:

Party Chairman Mr. Kalevi Kivistö announced on Thursday that PDL is against the plan of purchasing new military equipment worth FM 300 million from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{22}

Characteristic of the dispute was that the argumentation was either in favour or against the arms purchases (only PDL was against, all the others in favour, including the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in one of its editorials). Table 1 shows the arguments for the appropriation. PDL's counter-arguments are shown in Table 2.

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
\textbf{Arguments in favour of the appropriation for the armed forces in the supplementary budget} & \textbf{frequency} \\
\hline
- to balance the Finnish-Soviet trade & 15 \\
- to secure jobs in the export industries & 7 \\
- to adhere to the programme recommended by the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee & 5 \\
- to corroborate Finland's security, to maintain the country's defence capability, independence, etc. & 3 \\
- in international comparison, the Finnish defence budget is very small & 1 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & \textbf{31} \\
\end{tabular}
\caption{Arguments in favour of the appropriation for the armed forces in the supplementary budget} \label{tab:arguments_favour}
\end{table}
Table 2. Arguments against the appropriation for the armed forces in the supplementary budget

- the Finnish-Soviet trade should not be balanced by arms purchases, but by purchases of machines, raw materials, etc. 9
- procedure: the military budget should be agreed upon in the budget and not in the supplementary budget; a comprehensive study of Finland's trade should be conducted; the people should be listened to; the democratic course of procedure should be observed 4
- miscellaneous:
  - public money could be spent in other, more useful ways 1
  - the arms purchases will impair the credibility of Finland's policy of neutrality and peace-promotion 1
  - the value of the arms purchases will exceed the recommendations of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee 1
  - the promises of the coming cutdown in the military budget given by the Prime Minister are not trustworthy 1

Total 17

We have to make a distinction between what was done by the groups in favour of the army appropriation, what was done by the PDL and what was done by the journalists. In this debate, the political groups gave arguments, 'played on the strings of the ideological'. The journalists did not give arguments, but produced publicity. - We shall come back to the role of journalists further on.

Those in favour of the military appropriation tried to articulate the dispute in terms of trade and labour policy. A typical statement was made by an MP of the Social Democratic Party (SPD): he stressed that

...the Social Democrats wish not to take a supporting stand to increased defence expenditure or related basic appropriations by voting for order warrants for the Armed forces. - Order warrants and additional appropriations must be seen as promoting attempts to regain balance in our trade with the Soviet Union, says Laine. 23

Among the arguments in favour, only the editorial of Helsingin Sanomat 24 was an obvious exception; it discussed the issue as a necessity of defence policy: we must have armament!

In reply, the People's Democratic League uses two main arguments. First, it admits the importance of balancing the trade with the Soviet Union, yet feels that balance should
not be achieved by buying arms but order goods. "According to the PDL, it is 'immoral and detrimental' to balance the trade by arms imports."25 Secondly, the PDL takes up procedure: the due course of decision-making would presuppose that the defence budget be decided upon in the annual budget, not in the supplementary budget. However, PDL's main line in this dispute is a moral condemnation of the arms purchases; it is "immoral and detrimental" to arm and, particularly, to muddle business with immoral armament policy. It is worth recalling, however, what Kalle has to say in Bertolt Brecht's Flüchtlings Gespräche:

I have often heard that business and economy are human things, only war is inhumane. But, first, business and economy are not humane and, secondly, by us, they lead to war.26

The People's Democratic League proposes a moral question of the arms appropriations; but it does not raise the question of the moral economy of war, as Brecht and Ewen do. In other words, it does not raise the question of the armed state as an ideological power. By doing this, the PDL, in fact, transforms the originally horizontal conflict into the vertical dimension of the ideological. Both parties of the conflict have to claim, in a sense, to the same ideological values, to morality. For the PDL, the arms purchases are "immoral and detrimental"; for the other party, to oppose them is immoral and detrimental.

According to the Prime Minister, the proposed increase in arms imports equals, in financial terms, our exports of textiles to the Soviet Union this year. - 'It would be irresponsible (immoral) to jeopardize these export possibilities and the jobs they provide', the Prime Minister said.27

A political conflict, such as this, when it claims to the same values and their symbolic forms, "detaches the symbolic forms, renders them autonomous, sanctifies them".28 The conflict concerning the arms purchases is an example of a process which Haug defines as the ideological turn from the inner social horizontal to the 'suprasocial' vertical (cf. Fig. 1).29 This example illuminates the political process in which the general structure of the ideological and thus elements of the moral economy of war are constituted. Here, it is politics that tends to turn into morality.

The budget and the crisis in the government. - A similar drama was repeated at the end of December when the Cabinet Ministers of the People's Democratic League had to resign as a consequence of a new political conflict around new arms appropriations. The conflict broke out when the 1983 budget proposal was brought to Parliament.

Helsingin Sanomat published 16 news stories on this issue. The first
ones were published on December 29, 1982, and after a short period of ferment, the case was closed by President Mauno Koivisto with a few comments in his New Year's speech (reported by the press 2.1.1983).

Table 3 gives the arguments in favour of the appropriation for the army. Again, all parties except the PDL (and some MPs of the Social Democratic Party) were in favour, as well as Helsingin Sanomat in one of its editorials and to some extent in its news coverage.

PDL's counter-arguments are given in Table 4 (including the arguments of the Social Democratic MPs who were against the appropriation. According to Helsingin Sanomat, three MPs of the SDP abstained:

The three MPs announced that the reasons for their decision lie in the critical stand the party and its various member organizations had taken against armament.

Again, those in favour of the arms purchases defined their case in public by referring to labour and trade policy. According to an editorial in Helsingin Sanomat, to refrain from arms purchases "... would have resulted in increasing unemployment in Finland as well as ... in increasing imbalance in the Finnish-Soviet trade".

The Minister of Defence emphasized this aspect more than that of defence policy:

... According to the Minister of Defence (Centre Party), had PDL's proposal been carried into effect, it would have meant a serious blow to Finnish industry. As for the defensive capability of the country, it would not, however, have been a catastrophe.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the government has already unanimously agreed upon the defence budget</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to secure jobs in export industry</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to balance the Finnish-Soviet trade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to preserve the parliamentary method of government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to maintain defence capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Total 11
Table 4. Arguments against the arms appropriation in budget proposal for 1983

- a stand of principle for disarmament
- the arms purchases contradict Finland’s disarmament policy
- The PDL has consistently taken a negative stand to arms appropriations in Parliament

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<th>Frequency</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td><strong>4</strong></td>
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Contrary to other instances, President Koivisto emphasized the defence policy aspect by stating that, in decision-making concerning arms appropriations and purchases, we have to bear in mind that "our country must be prepared to defend itself". 33

The bulk of the arguments in the budgetary dispute in December did not, however, concern trade and labour policy; instead, they focused on procedure. Different parties emphasized that the government had been unanimous about the defence budget. A typical example is the following extract from newspaper coverage:

The Minister of Finance would find it very odd and awkward if the PDL would not vote for with the rest of the government, considering that the issue has already been agreed upon three times. 34

According to Helsingin Sanomat (editorial), 35 to define the issue as a Cabinet question

... was necessary not only because of the importance of the issue (arms purchases) itself, but in view of maintaining the parliamentary method of government. ... Parliametaryism means that there is a relationship of confidence and cooperation between the executive power and Parliament, and that matters of government are administered with the blessing of Parliament or at least part of it.

Thus, the disagreement between the Cabinet Ministers and the MPs of the PDL turns out to be detrimental to the system of government. When the MPs wish to choose another path than the ministers of their own party have agreed upon in the government, this is condemned as a breach of rules.

The newspaper developed this opposition even further; to some extent, an image of a 'community' and a 'counter-community' gnawing asunder the community began to take shape. ‘A republic called Finland represents the community, 'the communists' represent the counter-community: "... the communists act as if they had no understanding of parliamentarism". The circle is closed by a categorical exclusion of the group from the commu-
nity: "The republic will manage without them".

PDL's counter-arguments (and the three MPs of the SDP) suggest, once again, that opposition to arms appropriation would indicate a stand of principle in favour of disarmament. Here, we have again two opposing moral stands vis-à-vis armament appropriations: those against it feel that arms purchases are immoral because they conflict with disarmament policy, whereas those in favour see that to oppose the purchases is immoral because it violates the unanimity of the state community.

Generally speaking, the treatment of the December crisis in the media differed from that of the crisis in the spring. In both cases it was PDL that tried to activate the insoluble contradiction "We must have armament! We must have disarmament!" in an attempt to change the value constellation's tuning to its own political advantage. PDL managed to put forth a purely moral question - rather a weak case as it did not contain practical answers to functional necessities of social life, neither in defence policy nor in trade policy.

The strategy of the groups in the majority changed. In the spring, the insoluble armament problem was transformed into an issue of trade and labour policy, and in the wake of this transformation, a practical solution was worked out.

In December, the same insoluble problem was transformed into a question of parliamentary form of government. More than half of the arguments in favour of the arms appropriation exclusively concerned procedure: the matter has been agreed upon, the agreement is to be respected. The minority of the arguments concerned trade and labour policy, not to talk of defence policy. The publicity dealt with the question as a governmental crisis and with how it was resolved. The problem was not conceived in terms of the PDL opposing the arms appropriation at all, but in terms of the PDL "overthrowing the government". 36 Attention was focused on speculation about the new government coalition, on who the new ministers will be and how the earlier crises in the government have been resolved. This was the second practical solution; restitution of the community in parliamentarism. In both crises, it was PDL which was discredited and defeated in a political struggle of its own making.

We also analysed the coverage of the 'crisis in government' in the main TV news-casts of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation. 37 The TV news focused, if possible, even more on the theme 'crisis in government' than the newspapers. Arms were mentioned by the TV news at the very outset of the crisis only. But already on the second
day of the crisis the arms were discarded in the news reporter's commentary as follows:

The arms appropriations are the symbol of the conflict. It is obvious that to vote for a unanimous government proposal will not make any party of the government more belligerent than voting against it. 38

Even the PDL Chairman stated in a TV-interview that he would hope that the friction between the government parties would not be significant, considering "the minor importance of the issue itself".

The crisis in the government was transformed into a drama of 'game of norms', typical of mass culture, in which the prevailing order is first challenged, only to be restituted later on. 39 The process began to resemble the 'game of norms' because TV in particular really dramatized the crisis in the government. The news told us over and again that "the government fell at the finishing line", as if in a sports event. By splitting the process into sequences of exciting events, the TV-news created an image of an efficient administrative apparatus. The public is offered an image of how the apparatus removes the impending danger in three days and restitutes the value system.

The game is most intense in the very openings of the newscasts. The first act was played on December 28, when the main news-cast was opened with the statement: "The dispute over the arms appropriations has surprisingly caused tension between the government parties". The second act was performed the following evening: "Good evening. The government has resigned." The final act was shown no later than the following day: "The governmental crisis has been resolved about an hour ago". - The 'game of norms' reminds us of what Ewen had to say about the mass culture panorama and the moral economy of war: "A relation of power is reaffirmed in the structuring of information: co-ordination of those in power, fragmentation for the rest of us". 40 The co-ordination was re-affirmed by President Koivisto in his New Year's speech: "I hope that the crisis we have just been through will not leave bad scars". 41

5. The Journalists

Both those in favour and those against the arms purchases argued their case in their own way, and both were given publicity. This formed the interface between 'them', the decision-makers, and 'us', non-decision-makers. But communication through the origin of Figure 1 does not mean that a) the crisis of governability would have been overcome, even less that b) the process would have yielded a new popular
hegemony. The interface is only a point of departure, where every option is available.

The interface is the point of departure because the readers of Helsingin Sanomat or viewers of television are not bound by the arguments of those in favour or against merely because they are published in the paper. On the contrary: publicity is always a challenging project. In this project, the decision-makers, for example, must get the people's support for one or another argument. The public is from the very outset isolated from decision-making; on the other hand, it is also protected against attempted influence in virtue of journalism which is normatively impartial, neutral and objective; it is both protected and isolated in the journalistic mediation. The decision-makers should thus, in one way or another, surpass the protection and isolation.

Now, one question is the balance of forces between the contending political parties. Another, the balance of forces between 'them' and 'us'. - It was possible to discern some strategies used by the winning political fraction in overcoming the public's isolation/protection in impartial, neutral and objective journalism; these strategies were naturally the same strategies that were used to defeat the PDL: 1) Articulation of the insoluble problem "Armament!/Disarmament!" as a gues-

tion of trade and labour policy. 2) Solution of the insoluble problem no more on the level of argument, but on the level of practical political action within the framework of parliamentarism. A third strategy 3) was the identification of armament with disarmament. As a political strategy, this means that attempts at disarmament make for an essential supporting strategy for the nation's armament policy. A following headline in Helsingin Sanomat, 27.5.1983, (though unrelated to our case) exemplifies this in a remarkable way:

Kongressi tähdensi Reaganille:

**MX osa aseriisuntaa**

Congress advises Reagan:

**MX part of disarmament**

In principle, the same strategy was used in the dispute over the supplementary budget analysed above, though in a somewhat more moderate form. Systematically, the arms purchases were discussed in terms of making the purchase earlier than planned; here we have the promise also:

Budget advances for the arms purchases was passed with a margin of 151-31. - In the second 1.6 million supplementary budget, order warrants for the Armed Forces for arms purchases worth 450 million from the SU are advanced. According to PM Kalevi Sorsa (SDP), this will be taken into account in the next budgets."42

Here, the promise to curb arma-
ment (a more moderate form of disarmament) is part and parcel of armament policy.

In consequence of all the different strategies, the state is reproduced, vis-à-vis the recipients of mass communication, as an ideological power which, within the frames of its own competence, is capable of solving the irreconcilable conflict "Armament!/Disarmament!".

But what were the journalists' options in this situation, particularly as to the third strategy? Joenniemi casts some light on the matter in his account of the peace movement in the US: "The outspokenness of the Reagan Administration has succeeded in making people fear arms in general. Now, it is the administration which is on the front line, whereas earlier it was the enemy..." According to Joenniemi, the peace movements want to assume personal responsibility for the questions of war, peace and security, and not to delegate it to others. This, in his view, is an indication of social participation.

The structures of the ideological are here fractured; the social conflicts are not lived out as a projected relationship with an external enemy, and ideal socialization (governing') from above does not function automatically.

PDL could have developed the controversy over the arms appropriations precisely in this direction. But governing' was not brought to the front line; it was arms as a moral question that occupied this position. In doing so, the PDL acted within the limits of the traditional mode of government. By invoking the conflict it made room for "the discreet language and approach of the old establishment" which in the US is hoped to "restore the domestic governability of deterrence policy".

If the PDL contributed to making room for the "discreet language and approach of the old establishment", it was the journalists who implemented it, thereby producing "domestic governability of deterrence policy".

The publicity around the armament dispute was primarily constituted by giving information about the decision-makers' arguments and actions to recipients, non-decision-makers. This was the dominant communicative structure. The structure limited the public's options to the following ones: 1) to agree with the arguments and action of the governmental majority, 2) to agree with the counter-arguments and counter-action of the PDL, or 3) to concede to political resignation with the mute opposition of 'them'/us' prevailing.

The third possibility is more or less analogous to working-class culture:

... there is an element of self-damnation in the taking on of subordinate roles in Western capitalism. However, this damnation is
experienced, paradoxically, as true learning, affirmation, appropriation and as a form of resistance.\textsuperscript{45}

Mass communication, which emphasizes the dissemination of information, entails a similar element of self-damnation: the subordinate position of the recipient (non-decision-maker) can be experienced, paradoxically, as "true learning, affirmation, appropriation, and as a form of resistance". This, in turn, reinforces the respective journalistic form through various feedback channels. Here, it would seem that we have a discursive social network, the elements of which "bind and stabilize one another reciprocally".\textsuperscript{46} Haug asks: "Is the Left able to lay hold of this network? Are we able to untie some of the bonds and to tie new ones?"

We are not talking about the Left, but about journalists. Are the journalists capable of laying hold of the social network, the elements of which "bind and stabilize one another reciprocally" so that the subordinate position of the recipient is experienced as true resistance, which, in turn, reinforces and maintains the journalistic culture, but simultaneously reinforces the dominant positions of decision-making as ideological powers? Are the journalists capable of untwisting some of the most essential bonds of this structure and to create new ones, elements of a new popular hegemony?

\textbf{An example.} - Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa attended the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament in June 1982. Sorsa is (in TV-news jargon) "perhaps the most active Finn who has worked for disarmament internationally".\textsuperscript{47}

Upon Sorsa's return from New York, his government's proposal to increase arms appropriations was passed in Parliament (votes: 151 for, 13 against). The Prime Minister himself worked actively for the proposal in Parliament.

It is not fair to say that the journalists failed to see the contradiction.

It is very rare that the Prime Minister has to defend the supplementary budget proposal in Parliament. It is acknowledged that Sorsa made his speech ... because the decision on arms purchases for him, President of the Disarmament Committee of the Socialist International, was personally difficult.\textsuperscript{48}

Similar statements were made in the TV-news.

The extract above shows that the journalist commented upon the situation by appealing to the public's compassion for the PM who finds himself in a difficult situation. By appealing to compassion, the role conflict (Sorsa for armament, Sorsa for disarmament) is reconciled, and the dialectics of 'disarmament policy supporting armament policy' is discarded. The potential for resistance is not articulated as a critical counter-speech addressed to
governing groups from below as irony, ridicule, etc.

Could we think of journalism as something which tries to occupy the necessity "We must have disarmament!", to remove it from the dominant discourse supporting armament and transform it into a demand of civil society, i.e. a demand with the necessary power to actually implement the measures for disarmament? Such journalism might deploy a counter-discourse which could oblige Sorsa through various means:

- by emphasizing the two roles of Sorsa (for armament, for disarmament; only in the first role is he capable of concrete measures, in the latter only of hopes and promises (which again re-affirm his measures in his first role);
- by indicating mistrust and irony every time Sorsa the Disarmer opens his mouth;
- a careful monitoring of both Sorsas' saldos;
- etc.

It is true that, since the "newspaper readers form their conceptions of the world on the basis of increasingly comprehensive and many-sided information", it is "not easy to manipulate people's knowledge and opinions nor their attitudes and behaviour".49

No, it is not easy, but not impossible either. But perhaps manipulation is not the most important thing after all. Maybe political journalism functions more importantly through making room for political decision-making processes within the structures of representative parliamentarism. And, if nothing else, at least the audiences' political resignation will contribute to this. Informative journalism (the main strand of journalism covering the political struggle we are studying here), may, in turn, be conceived of as an element of political resignation.

But why not pose the question the other way round: What journalistic conditions would allow the people to have an independent stance in social affairs as they are wielded in the social reality produced in journalism from day to day?

It is a form of uninured resistance to be capable of resisting the manipulation of one's opinions (and informative journalism performs this function for the people); it is a form of inured resistance to be capable of steering one's own society. We need not ask, in the first place, whether people's consciousness and behaviour are subject to manipulation (they are not). Instead, we could ask whether people have their say, on a day-to-day basis, in handling the rudder of their own world. We believe that one of the journalistic preconditions for that would be to have such critical journalism that would actively challenge the existing dominant communicative
relations from above to below through creating communications in the opposite direction as well.

6. And So ...

...what was the publicity like that was produced by the controversy over the arms appropriations we analysed above? Our intention was to analyse whether the process brought about moral economy of war or peace, ideological governability or popular hegemony.

There were two distinct stages of the process, not only in terms of time but also in terms of their character. The first period was the dispute over the supplementary budget in spring 1982, and the other one the dispute over the military appropriations in the budget for 1983, which resulted in the readjustment of the cabinet. The first stage was characterized by arguments in favour of and against arms purchases in terms of trade policy and employment. In the second stage, the arms themselves were removed into the background, and the question of the new tunings and strumnings in the political machinery (in the relationships between government, parties and Parliament) became the central issue. Why did the stages differ from one another so drastically, although the issue itself, in a sense, was exactly the same (arms appropriations)?

One possible interpretation is the following: As for the controversy in the spring, the People's Democratic League - including its Cabinet Ministers - announced in good time that they were against the arms appropriations in the supplementary budget. The various parties of the conflict knew this, as well as the rules of the game, well in advance; the political conflict was, in a sense, resolved in advance. The planned political struggle was carried through, a struggle in which the parties played on the strings of the ideological, trying to 'change their tuning' to their advantage. The December struggle was carried through without a mutually agreed plan. Due to internal conflicts, the Cabinet Ministers and the MPs of the People's Democratic League were in disagreement. That was defined as a tactical error which helped to shift the focus of discussion from arms to parliamentarism and to the eligibility of the PDL to be in the government.

We observed earlier how the contradiction 'Armament!/Disarmament!' was resolved and reconciled within the ideological in the spring. Here, the state was transformed into an ideological power which undertakes both of the necessary functions, i.e., the defense function and diminishing the threat of war/Weapons, so that the armament measures of today will be
supported by disarmament in the future. The government is the central state organ here. However, after the controversy over the supplementary budget there was an element in the government, i.e., the PDL, which was not able or willing to reconcile armament and disarmament within the ideological, nor to develop the conflict to an open controversy about the ideological, that is, about the state as an ideological power over and above society. PDL's status in the government was, after the spring conflict, quite controversial and unclear; in other words, the process of reproducing the ideological was fractured in the spring.

The round in December could be conceived, then, as a concluding of the process, when the political apparatus is reconciled with the ideological practice (at its crudest: armament = disarmament) which was developed already in the spring. Therefore, the centrality of argumentation in spring, the adjustment of the apparatus in December.

In this way, horizontal societal conflicts may yield ideological domination - especially as no attempts were in public made to tear apart the fabric of ideological practices produced already in the spring and formulated by Prime Minister Sorsa in December, just before the crisis in the government, as follows:

According to Sorsa, the impact of Finnish defence policy on the international development of armament is very modest. 'If it were our intention, we should abolish the whole army ...' - Instead, the instrument Finland has at her disposal in slowing down the arms race is, according to Sorsa, active disarmament policy; Finland's activities in the UN, the CSCE and in bilateral diplomacy.

It seems to us that the publicity around the arms purchases reproduced the basic structure of the ideological. Though we proposed at the beginning of this paper that the ideological and the moral economy of war are almost identical, it is by no means sure that the publicity around the arms issue yielded moral economy of war in Ewen's terms. Essentially, there was no conspicuous external threat (either in reality or as an articulation in the discourse) involved in the process. (Regardless of the fact that, as a result, the PDL was excluded from the government, and there were attempts in the newspaper discourse to exclude it from the whole nation. This did not develop into a dominant theme, as happened with the real or imaginary adversary submarines on the Swedish and Norwegian coasts.) From Finland's standpoint, it is difficult to find a plausible external enemy; with the best possible candidate, the country has friendly relations and extensive cooperation.

The ideological articulation of na-
nationalism proved hidden and ambiguous. Finland contra a diffuse and generalized external threat. But even an ambiguous threat suffices to articulate the national ideologically:

The parliamentary defence committees have, according to Sorsa, significantly contributed to the development of a unified conception of defence matters. This unity has been part of broader political integration, unity which by the 1980s has fully developed as regards matters of both foreign and economic policy. - The national instinct of self-preservation invites us to protect this mutual understanding and the related endeavours to conciliation by every means.51

This is sufficient to tune in the communitarian aspect of the ideological but not the moral economy of war, which still remains, in our analysis, only a potential within the ideological. This might indicate that, in Finland, the ideological is rather weak as regards questions of war and peace. Nevertheless, the weakness of the ideological does not imply that this is a result of practices, such as 'peace journalism', working against the ideological powers. And, as long as these practices are weak, the intrinsic potentiality of the moral economy of war within the ideological will remain unravelled but liable to be unravelled.

Notes


2. Ibid., p. 81.


7. It is worth mentioning that the PIT-group has been criticised for the use of such spatial metaphors (from above vs. from below). See e.g. Klaus Holzkamp, Base/superstructure - above/below: spatial metaphors and the theory of ideology. In S. Hänninen & L. Paldan (eds.) op.cit.


9. Ibid., p. 15.

10. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

11. As well as revolutions, see Risto Alapuro, Kansalaisota vallankumouksena (Civil war as a revolu-

12. Managers are those in a position to control various social resources. To conceive of class structure in this manner is not to disregard the meaning of ownership structuring society but only to focus on another dimension. Erik Olin Wright's class theory is formulated on this basis. His theory has been used in an international comparative study of class structures (Finland included). Erik Olin Wright, *Class, Crisis and the State*. London 1978.


18. *Helsingin Sanomat* is - by a wide margin - the largest daily newspaper in Finland with a circulation well over 400 000 (with the country's population staying 4.8 million). The number of daily readers is estimated at around 1.2 million.


21. The People's Democratic League attracts both socialists and com-


37. We wish to express our thanks to the Finnish Broadcasting Company for their assistance in making the videotapes available.


41. TV-News 1.1.1983.


43. Joenniemi, *op.cit.*, p. 198; em-
phasis added.

44. Ibid., p. 198.


