The “Four Theories” here refers to a small book by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, first published by the University of Illinois Press in 1956 and reprinted in more copies (over 80,000) – also translated into more languages – than perhaps any other textbook in the field of journalism and mass communication. This work was a bestseller for decades, because it obviously filled an intellectual gap among communication academics as well as journalism professionals. With the growth of the media there was inevitably a need to articulate the roles and tasks of mass media in society – including the relationship between media and politics – but in this respect the emerging scholarship had little to offer, and therefore even a casual collection of essays became a niche and a classic.

As suggested by the “Beyond,” however, the classic is already a museum piece. Its analytical inadequacy and its political bias have been recognized, especially by the critical school of communication research since the late 1960s. Several complementary and alternative attempts to define the normative theories of the media have been made – not least by conservative scholars – without any of them gaining the same momentum as the original Four Theories. Today, towards the end of the 1990s, the question is no longer whether or not the classic is passé but what is the best way to get beyond it.

A most useful eyeopener was recently provided by a group of scholars from the same College of Communications in the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where the three authors of the classic once worked. Last Rights, edited by John Nerone and published by the University of Illinois Press in 1995, revisits Four Theories by critically assessing its relevance in a post-cold war world. After this impulse from the birthplace of the classic, the arena is open for new and different approaches. One such attempt is being developed by a group of five colleagues, including this author.

The present article first reviews not only the dominant model of the four theories but also several other proposals for normative theories of the media developed over the years. Secondly, a preview is given of the new beginning, which the present author is pursuing with his colleagues to tackle the question of normative theories
of the media. The article is written as an essay to introduce and discuss a challenge rather than to make a definite proposal.

The four and other typologies

*Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al., 1956) introduced, according to its subtitle, "The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do." These concepts or theories grew out of the question: Why do the media of mass communication appear in widely different forms and serve different purposes in different countries? – a typical task for anyone studying or teaching comparative or world media systems. The authors started with the thesis that "the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted" (Siebert et al., 1956: 1-2).

Such a task and such a thesis make great sense, but the four theories typology (summarized e.g., in Lambeth, 1995: 5) turned out to be a poor response to the authors' own challenge. As pointed out by Nerone (1995), "Four Theories does not offer four theories: it offers one theory with four examples" (Nerone, 1995: 18); "it defines the four theories from within one of the four theories – classical liberalism...it is specifically in classical liberalism that the political world is divided into individual versus society or the state" (Nerone, 1995: 21); "Four Theories and classical liberalism assume that we have freedom of the press if we are free to discuss political matters in print without state suppression" (Nerone, 1995: 22).

In a wider perspective, Nerone (1995) makes the point about the moment in intellectual history at which *Four Theories* was written: "By the mid-twentieth century, liberalism had reached a philosophical impasse. And, while political theory has moved beyond the impasse of liberalism, mainstream normative press theory in the United States has not" (Nerone, 1995: 4). The impasse was mainly caused by the fact that it was no longer feasible to view individuals as atoms, with natural rights, at a time when "politics became the stuff of institutions rather than of individuals" (Nerone, 1995: 5). Moreover, the press had become an institution, separate from the people, and "it became more intelligent to talk about the public’s rights – the right to know, the right to free expression – rather than the press’s rights. The press had responsibilities; the public had rights" (Nerone, 1995: 6).

*Last Rights* helps to deconstruct *Four Theories* – as typology, scholarship and ideology. This homework is indeed a logical first step for anyone who wishes to get beyond the famous typology by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm. Yet there are a number of other typologies worth recalling, regardless of their relationship to the four theories. In point of fact, the European examples listed below have little or no kinship with the American four theories, and therefore it would be misleading to view the latter as a universal baseline. On the other hand, several typologies have been proposed, especially in the United States, precisely intended to complement and revise the "original" four theories. We shall begin with the American revisions (with Mundt, 1991, and Lambeth, 1995, as useful guides), continuing our brief review through Europe to the Third World.

The United States

The first American to be listed among revisionists of the four theories is John Merrill (University of Missouri and Louisiana). With his colleague Ralph Lowenstein (Missouri and Florida), Merrill had developed in classes on mass media and society a critical approach to the four theories typology. Their textbook of 1971 made a distinction between media ownership (private, multi-party, government) and press philosophies, the latter displaying four types which were more differentiated than the original four: authoritarian with negative government controls, social-centralist with positive government controls, libertarian without any government controls, and social-libertarian with minimal government controls (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1971: 186). Lowenstein refined the classification in the second edition of this textbook, adding a fifth philosophy: social-authoritarian (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979: 164), and gave final shape to his typology in another joint book (Lowenstein & Merrill, 1990).

Meanwhile, John Merrill pursued his own line in *The Imperative of Freedom* (Merrill, 1974) by criticizing not only the four theories, particularly the social responsibility theory, but also the generally accepted notions of "the people's right to know," "right of access to the media," and the press as "fourth branch of government." He considered these as libertarian myths, which limited true freedom of the media and journalists. Such an ultralibertarian position led Merrill to advocate non-utilitarian (Kantian) ethics and finally "existential journalism" (Merrill, 1977). Actually Merrill's contribution to media typologies was to reduce rather than to enrich the variation; his thinking is crystallized in a simple "political-press circle" between the poles of authoritarianism/totalitarianism and libertarianism/anarchy (Merrill, 1974: 42; Lambeth, 1995: 7). Still, he played a vital role as an uncompromising home critic of the libertarian camp.

William Hachten (University of Wisconsin) followed in the early 1980s with a revision retaining the authoritarian and communist concepts, but combining the libertarian and social responsibility variants into an overall "western" concept, and adding two new ones: revolutionary and developmental (Hachten, 1981). A revolutionary role was played by the early Pravda as well as various later samizdat outlets – from mimeographed newsletters to audiocassettes and e-mail – which
challenged the existence of a monolithic political order. A developmental role was obvious to everyone who was aware of Third World realities (Hachten had experience from Africa). Accordingly, Hachten’s typology consisted of five concepts, but in the third edition of The World News Prism (Hachten, 1992) he suggests that after the collapse of communism we might be back to four concepts (not, however, identical with those of Four Theories).

Robert Picard (Emerson College and State University of California, Fullerton) in the middle of the 1980s added one more variant to earlier typologies: democratic socialist (Picard, 1985). His source of inspiration was Western Europe, especially Scandinavia, where he observed that state intervention in media economics was exercised to ensure, and not to endanger, the survival of a free media “as instruments of the people, public utilities through which the people’s aspirations, ideas, praise, and criticism of the state and society may be disseminated” (Picard, 1985: 70). Picard’s democratic socialist theory, together with the original libertarian and social responsibility theories, constitutes three forms of western philosophy, whereas the rest of the world can be seen to be covered by Hachten’s developmental and revolutionary concepts as well as the original authoritarian and communist theories (Picard, 1985: 69; Mundt, 1991: 25).

Herbert Altschull (Indiana and Johns Hopkins Universities) presented in his Agents of Power (1984; second edition 1995), not just a revision of the four theories, but an alternative paradigm based on the view that in all systems the news media are agents of those who exercise political and economic power (first of his “Seven laws of journalism”; Altschull, 1984: 298; 1995: 440). Still, he offers a three-part classification of media systems in the contemporary world: market or western nations, Marxist or communitarian nations, and advancing or developing nations. In each of the three worlds there are, especially among journalists, broadly held views on press freedom, on the purposes of journalism and a number of other “articles of faith” – both real and illusory – exposed by Altschull from a perspective fundamentally different from standard American libertarianism.

All in all, the American attempts to go beyond the four theories – from Merrill to Altschull – constitute a fairly rich reservoir of ideas and pedagogically useful typologies. The various proposals clearly suggest that Four Theories has failed to meet the scholarly challenge. Nevertheless, it enjoyed considerable respect and was widely used until the present day. Ironically, even the 1994 edition of a standard undergraduate textbook Modern Mass Media (with John Merrill as the first of three authors!) actually lists the original four theories under a chapter on press and government. On the other hand, the by now classic Introduction to Mass Communications, in its latest edition no longer reproduces all four theories but only two of them: authoritarian and libertarian (Agee et al., 1994: 27).

The United Kingdom

The first notable European proposal for classifying contemporary media systems comes from the UK and the early 1960s. Raymond Williams, the British cultural historian and a vital intellectual source for European media scholarship included in his Communications (Williams, 1962) a typology of four communication systems: authoritarian, paternal (“an authoritarian system with a conscience”), commercial, and democratic.

This was an openly normative typology, highlighting the necessity and feasibility of a democratic communication system providing public service and a right to communicate free from the limitations of the three preceding systems – “not only an individual right, but a social need, since democracy depends on the active participation of all its members” (Williams, 1962: 93; for a summary and background, see Sparks, 1993). Even if the actual development of media systems in Europe and elsewhere over the past three decades has not followed a particularly democratic path (as defined by Williams), the typology is still relevant both as an intellectual-analytical tool and as a political project.

Somewhere between Williams and the American Siebert et al. can be seen the four types of roles which journalism may play in the state, proposed by Peter Golding and Philip Elliott in their international study of broadcast news from the mid-1970s (when only Merrill and Lowenstein had critically examined the Four Theories). Their first type was the classic fourth estate, in which journalism acts as an independent watchdog, the second was journalism as a public relations wing of totalitarian government, the third was a party-related political role yet independent from the government, and the fourth was the role of a neutral observer (Golding & Elliott, 1979: 46). This useful classification did not achieve larger recognition, nor did the authors subsequently elaborate it.

However, British media scholars did go on in the spirit of Williams and later cultivated the concept of a democratic media system. In this exercise, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his concept of the public sphere became an increasingly important source of inspiration. An illuminating example of this approach is provided by James Curran. In one contribution (Curran, 1991a) he reassessed the role of media as watchdog, as consumer representative and as source of information, arriving at a working model of democratic media system. In another contribution (Curran, 1991b) he compares liberal and radical approaches, particularly the two dominant types of free-market liberal and collectivist-statist, proposing a third route to combine them as “radical democratic.” More recently, John Keane (1995) and Nicholas Garnham (1995) pursued the issue from contrasting and compelling standpoints.
Scandinavia

Finland produced in the late 1960s – without notable attention to the US four theories and practically no knowledge of the British debate – a typology of her own as a byproduct of rethinking the role of the national broadcasting system (Nordenstreng, 1973; Pietilä et al., 1990). The three types of broadcasting, or media systems in general, were based on the primary objectives of social communication in question: first confessional (political, religious, etc.), second commercial (run by advertising, feeding consumerism), and third informational, based on maximizing audience enlightenment and exercising neither ideological, nor commercial censorship.

Obviously this was a normative typology, designed to promote the information option, according to which the media should transmit different world views instead of a hegemonic ideology. It was created in the spirit of the radical 1960s, but in fact it was not far from classic liberalism and standard Western journalism, which is also dedicated to pursuing the truth (representing epistemological realism). The typology was transformed into a set of informational news criteria (Ahmavaara et al., 1973; Nordenstreng, 1972), and for a few years it dominated national media policy debate, which at that time had an anti-commercial democratic orientation – a Nordic parallel to the British debate.

The informational policy line was further strengthened by classifying media ownership systems into three types depending on whether the control was exercised by civic associations (party and special interest press), by the Parliament (public service broadcasting), or by private capital (commercial media). Measured in turnover, private capital controlled 70%, while the other two forms of “democratic control” accounted for a mere 30%.

Such perspectives did not survive the 1980s and 1990s, which in Finland as in most other European countries were dominated by an offensive of commercial media forces and related postmodern ideas, including scepticism about media as vehicles of information. Still, the Finnish typology stands as a curious and instructive footnote to history.

The rest of Scandinavia, particularly Sweden, should be noted here for the typology used to officially define the functions which mass media play in democratic society and prepared in deliberations concerning state subsidies to the press (Borden, 1995). Beginning with the overriding function to ensure free opinion building, the tasks of the media boil down to three: first to inform (media should provide citizens with such information that they may freely and independently form opinions on socio-political issues), second to criticize (media should be an independent institution monitoring and investigating the decision makers in society), and third to provide a forum (media should ensure public space for actors representing different views).

Continental Europe

Early German sociology and political science had a lot to offer for reflections on the media-society relationship (Hardt, 1979), but there is little genuine scholarship from the postwar Germany that is worth recalling here – apart from Habermas. As far as the rest of continental Europe is concerned, there are two scholars on normative theories of the media to be noted here.

Denis McQuail, a British sociologist working in the Netherlands (University of Amsterdam), presented in his Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (1983) the first European-based revision of the Four Theories, while the British and Scandinavian typologies listed above were not made with specific reference to the American classic. McQuail took the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet theories more or less for granted, but he added two more: development media theory and democratic-participant media theory (McQuail, 1983: 84–98). The development theory is essentially the same as that proposed by Hachten in the US – independently and around the same time – and the democratic-participant theory is not far from the democratic variant proposed by Williams in the UK two decades earlier, or that by Curran one decade later.

McQuail retained his typology of four plus two in the second (1987) and third (1994) editions of this canonic textbook, just adding references to other proposals. However, in the latest edition he makes a point about the limitations of the press theory approach, because, for instance, with its focus on political news and information, there is “little of relevance in any of the variants of theory named which might realistically be applied to the cinema, to the music industry, to the video market or even to a good deal of sport, fiction and entertainment of television, thus to much of what the media are doing most of the time” (McQuail, 1994: 133). Also, he notes that the theories were typically formulated in very general terms, whereas actual media institutions and practices in most countries “display a mixture of several elements: libertarian, ‘responsible’ and authoritarian” (McQuail, 1994: 133).
Karol Jakubowicz from Poland has written a lot, particularly about the media transformation in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (see, e.g., Jakubowicz, 1995; 1996). He was unimpressed from the beginning by the prospects for true freedom and democracy, first following glasnost and later following the collapse of communism. In his contribution to an East-West dialogue on democratization and the media, Jakubowicz (1990) offers an illuminating overview and analysis of various press theories. He challenges the conventional premise of the normative theories that the media are different by virtue of belonging to different social systems and proposes two dimensions for drawing maps of media systems and theories: first, autonomy vs. subordination of the media in relation to the power structure, and second, pluralism vs. dominance of the basic character of media content (Jakubowicz, 1990: 44).

Figure 1 reproduces the “maps” which Jakubowicz constructed by placing the original four theories and the two additions by McQuail along the two dimensions. The maps expose the discrepancy between political theory and actual practice – particularly as far as the libertarian theory (typically glorified by Americans) is concerned, but to a lesser extent also regarding the social responsibility and development theories (as Merrill admonished!).

Figure 1. “Maps” of theories of the press, adapted from Jakubowicz (1990: 45-46)

PHILOSOPHICAL OR POLITICAL RATIONALE

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ACTUAL PATTERNS OF MEDIA

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Pluralism

Yet it is likely that particularly Islam will give rise not only to concepts of media ethics (Mowlana, 1989) but also to normative theories of the media.

An example is seen in a consultation on press systems in the ASEAN countries, held in Indonesia in 1988: “Unlike the individualistic, democratic, egalitarian and liberal tradition of Western political theory, some societies value their consensual and communal traditions with their emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony” (Mehra, 1989: 3). However, no theory of society and media is articulated, apart from political phrases about nation-building, freedom and responsibility. Obviously, developing countries with basically western orientation (such as ASEAN) are bound to be intellectually dependent on western political philosophies and media theories. The only major window of opportunity for alternative Third World perspectives has been provided by the media reform movement towards a New World Information and Communication Order (Vincent et al., 1997).

An interesting, although not particularly Third World oriented, typology was recently proposed by a Malaysian scholar Mohd Safar Hasim (1996). Starting with the classic governmental powers – executive, legislative and judiciary – he added the fourth branch of government, the press, as well as the too often forgotten party, the people. With these five elements he then constructed types of power-sharing in society, the main three of which are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Three main models of separation and integration of power according to Safar (1996).

A new beginning

In the late 1980s the present author joined four colleagues who shared a concern about what to put in the place of Four Theories. These “soul brothers” are Clifford
intention was something of the kind – after all, the essays were an offshoot of the National Council of Churches’ commission to Wilbur Schramm to elaborate on responsibility in mass media. Yet in reality the book became coopted by the prevailing ideology in the USA, both political and professional, as exposed in Last Rights.

The new beginning is inspired by the idea of raising professional consciousness within the media world – including media scholarship. We see that normative theories may not only serve as vehicles of conservative indoctrination but can also be made to sensitize media policymakers and professionals to acknowledge their own dependencies – by exposing the kind of discrepancies between philosophical rationales and actual operations as shown above in the maps by Jakubowicz (or as shown in an illustration of ideal and real relations between media, government and people in Nordenstreng, 1995: 119). Thus normative theories are justified, not as affirmative instruments to strengthen the prevailing ideology – typically the case of Four Theories – but as emancipatory instruments to stand back from the prevailing ideology. In this respect, normative theories support media autonomy and self-regulation.

At the same time, however, we are inspired by the challenge posed by the two types of theories: ideal and real, normative and sociological. After reviewing the past attempts towards “theories of the press,” one is no longer sure whether they cover the ideal or the real level. Obviously a new beginning must cover both, and not just to create emancipatory effects but also to join the eternal project of mass communication research: to understand the media, particularly in relation to society.

Today this project is particularly challenging, as new media and new types of messages enter the field (pointed out by McQuail above) and as this “information society” is moreover characterized by globalization, with simultaneous tendencies for localization (i.e., “glocalization” as proposed by Majid Teheranian in Vincent et al., 1997). Furthermore, a fundamental soul-searching is going on among social scientists, with classics such as Georg Simmel experiencing a revival in information society and communitarianism gaining momentum in the heartlands of liberalism. For example, a Finnish media sociologist, comparing legal dogmatics with social science, concludes (paraphrasing Simmel): “The idea of society does not belong to the same conceptual order as incidents and regularities of behaviour that are facts in the realm of ‘is’; the idea of society is a norm, and you find it in the domain of the ‘ought’” (Pietilä, 1997).

The new beginning does not aim at a universally valid typology. First, it deliberately limits itself to what might be called democratic theories, following the perspectives of democracy by Held (1987; 1995). Building the framework on models of democracy rather than models of communication also helps to avoid the tendency to develop a ‘fortress journalism syndrome’: to think in terms of media instead of the people. Second, it avoids a pigeonhole approach whereby each media system is placed in one category only. Instead, it suggests that each national media system
Five paradigms

Reflecting upon the various proposals for normative theories, particularly from the point of view of their relevance to the contemporary world, we arrived at a typology of five paradigms:

1) Liberal-individualist paradigm
A 'pure' version of the old libertarian theory, whereby individual liberty is the cornerstone of democracy, a freedom typically exercised through – and realized in – an open marketplace. Minimal role for the state ("night watchman") and no public right to know, nor public interest – just the public's interest as the interests of the individuals who comprise the public. No content criteria for media performance; accountability measured by market forces requiring the media to honour individual freedom of choice.

2) Social responsibility paradigm
The original proposal by the Hutchins Commission and its philosopher Ernest Hocking stated that freedom of expression was not an inalienable natural right but an earned moral right, with obligations beyond self-interest. This contemporary version takes another step beyond this and the egalitarian appeals by Rorty and Rawls, suggesting that the cornerstone of the political order is not an equitable process but a social conception of the good and a common understanding of the moral subject. Thus news becomes an agent of community formation, the goal of reporting being active citizenship, instead of abundant information.

3) Critical paradigm
A version somewhere between Hachten's revolutionary and Curran's radical democratic theories, based on the Gramscian notion of hegemony and the Habermasian concept of public sphere. Freedom of expression is articulated in terms of repressive powers on the one hand, and oppressed masses on the other. Media are strategically located at the nexus of social structures and social consciousness, with a potential for emancipating the masses. Manifested in alternative media on the local level and the NWICO movement on the world scale.

4) Administrative paradigm
A new variant based on the notion of objective information, on the assumption of authoritative sources, and on the commitment to efficient transmission of this reliable information to many. Developed in line with the "modern" standards of technocratic excellence, has ambitions of professionalism in the service of political and economic elites (organized, corporativist interests), but remains insensitive towards people at large. Applicable to both quality papers (The New York Times) and public service broadcasting (the BBC).

5) Cultural negotiation paradigm
Another new type inspired by cultural studies and theological media theory. In contrast to the previous paradigm, denies a universal rationality, objective information and professional-bureaucratic efficiency. Capitalizing on the rights of subcultures with their particularistic values, promotes intersubjective understanding and a real sense of community. Media serve both communitarianism and cultural negotiation between conflicting values, aiming at mediations through drama rather than news.

While such a typology offers some food for thought, we do not present it as our alternative to Four Theories. We rather open several windows for a critical look at the way people – particularly professional communicators – speak and think about the media in society. One such window is provided by the roles which media play in democratic societies.

Four roles

There are countless ways to characterize the roles of the press and other media in society. The following classification of four stages is based on varying degrees of media autonomy:

1) Collaborative – a role the media play when a nation state is young and insecure; in times of war, emergency, etc.
2) Surveillance – a role typically designated as adversary, watchdog and agenda-setter ("AWA" role by Altschull), when violations of the moral and social order are exposed; also informational role when bringing important issues to the attention of the community.
3) Facilitative – a role for the media where journalists seek to create and sustain public debate ("conversation" model by Carey); essence of the public or civic journalism movement.
4) Critical/dialectical – a role for the media when journalists examine in a truly radical way the assumptions and premises of a community; constitutes public debate about, not within, the prevailing political order.

Such roles and such paradigms serve us as staple ingredients when trying to repackage this old but most problematic topic in both an intellectually and pedagogically satisfactory way.
Jan Servaes & Rico Lie (eds.)

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Cultural Identity in the Age of Globalization

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