Computational Rationality and Rational Choice: Denying Agentive Autonomy

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Pinni B-building lecture hall 4141, address: Kanslerinrinne 1

Sonja Amadae (TINT, University of Helsinki) at research seminar of philosophy.

Steven Hawking recently declared that, "Philosophy is dead."  Indeed, not just philosophers but all humans are caught between the cognitive revolution of neuroscience on the one hand, and the information technology revolution of artificial intelligence on the other.  

Both Copernican-style revolutions give human agents reason to reflect on the nature of intelligence and free will.  Rather than defend free will and agentive autonomy, in this paper I argue that rational choice theory proposes a theory of computable rationality that necessarily proposes an internalist account of preferences, beliefs, and reasons for action:  preferences and beliefs provide reasons for action that are motivationally binding and act as cause.  

This account is thoroughly consequentialist and functionalist. I argue that it provides a theory of agency that falls short of a robust account of agency necessary to defend the type of agentive autonomy typically held to be consistent with moral accountability.



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For more information, please contact:
Arto Laitinen
050 318 7018