With two notable exceptions, legislative-executive relations in the realm of foreign and security policy have attracted remarkably little scholarly attention. One exception is the recent wave of studies on the parliamentary control of military missions that have emerged in the wake of the so-called Democratic Peace debate. The other exception is the vast number of studies on the US Congress whose unparalleled power has made it impossible to ignore in any comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy. For almost every other democratic country, however, the study of legislative-executive relations in external relations short of the use of force is by and large unchartered territory.

Scholarly interest in this topic has been discouraged in several ways. First, in contrast to the single remaining superpower (USA), the foreign policies of virtually every other country seem less consequential and naturally attract less scholarly interest. Second, in contrast to the presidential checks-and-balances system of the USA, the parliamentary systems of European democracies are characterized by a fusion between government and its parliamentary majority, with conflicts thus arising mostly along party-political, not institutional lines. Third, a viable tradition in political theory holds that the role of parliament does and should stop at the ‘water's edge’ where an area of executive privileges and responsibilities begin. Granting parliaments veto powers makes international bargaining more difficult — and can certainly be expected to work against major reforms to the rules of global or regional cooperation. Status quo bias in world politics thus increases when the role of the legislature and other domestic veto-players is more institutionalized. Fourth and related to the previous point, traditional notions of dividing labor between the sub-disciplines in political science suggest that comparative politics scholars study legislative-executive relations but stop at the water's edge where the domain of international relations scholars begins whose natural focus is on the relations of the executive with other executives or international organisations.

This lack of research is regrettable for various reasons. As suggested above, there is a long line of thinking arguing that foreign and security policy is (and even should be) dominated by the executive, with parliaments wielding marginal or at best limited influence. However, the lack of research beyond the very specific case of US Congress means that we actually do not know whether such ‘accepted wisdom’ applies to current European democracies. Hence there is a demand for subjecting this notion of ‘executive drift’ to careful empirical scrutiny. Previously one could also more plausibly argue that international issues were significantly

2 An overview of the research on the US Congress is provided in the second section.
3 King 1976; Döring 1995; Strøm et al. 2003.
less relevant for voters, thus further reducing incentives for both parliamentary engagement and for research on the topic. But clearly the world has become much more interdependent over the past few decades, and particularly in the post-Cold War context. How to manage global and regional trade, energy and environmental policies, and immigration are now regularly on the political agendas of democratic countries throughout the world, and such policies have more explicit distributional consequences for constituencies. International commitments are also probably more expensive than before, and when considering the financial uncertainty and budget deficits that characterise most democratic countries, legislatures have also stronger economic incentives to curb executive discretion in foreign policy. Moreover, higher levels of education and more varied sources of information have brought about a comparably well-informed and interested public that pays more attention to international questions, thus providing an increasing ‘electoral connection’ to foreign affairs. And finally, as studies on parliamentary control of military missions and on the US Congress demonstrate, a lot can be learnt from these cases for our overall understanding of legislative-executive relations.

This collection of papers aims at overcoming the lack of scholarly attention to parliaments (other than the US Congress) in foreign and security policy. Its ambition is to draw conclusions about legislative-executive relations in this field on the basis of evidence from mostly European democracies in various cases of foreign and security policy. Our guiding question goes to the very heart of legislative-executive relations: which factors allow parliaments to exercise influence over the executive and, by implication, under which circumstances does the executive succeed in maintaining or re-capturing executive privilege? The next section re-visits the debate about executive dominance in foreign affairs, explaining why we should see more active parliamentary engagement in this area than before. Based on principal-agent models, the third section contains our theoretical framework which focusses on both the factors facilitating parliamentary engagement and the multiple instruments MPs have for becoming involved in foreign affairs.

**Weak parliaments and strong executives?**

It is customary to argue that foreign policy is very much dominated by the executive – and indeed that such bias in favour of the government benefits the country. Decision-making in foreign policy is characterized by limited openness and secrecy is often presented as integral to the advancement of national interests. As the efficient conduct of foreign policy, especially regarding use of force, requires flexibility and fast reactive capacity, parliamentary

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4 There is evidence that at least some parliaments spend a considerable amount of time and other resources on international affairs. For the German Bundestag, for example, Ismayr (2007: 181-184) reports that one in five plenary debates is about international affairs (many of them attracting a lot of public attention), and a fifth of legislation concerns international treaties. No wonder then that parliaments have invested considerable resources into specialized committees, staff, hearings and field trips that would remain puzzling if it would not indicate the ambition to enhance the role of parliament in foreign affairs.

5 Norris 2011.

6 Aldrich et al. 2006.
involvement may cause unnecessary delays that obstruct the achievement of important foreign policy goals. Foreign policy also often requires national unity and demands that the major political parties at least try to build consensus on these issues. These notions apply particularly to decisions with military implications: “as security policy is taken to require particularly rapid decision-making and, at times, a high degree of secrecy, it is regarded as the exclusive domain of the executive and thus lying outside the sphere of parliamentary control.”

In Europe it has been commonly understood or almost taken for granted that the logic of parliamentarism further marginalizes legislatures, with foreign policy viewed as an issue area where parliaments exercise most delegation to the executive. However, recent work on parliamentary scrutiny of European Union (EU) affairs has increasingly challenged such notions of executive drift, and as argued in the introductory section, there is a need to investigate whether domestic legislatures also manage to influence government activities in other foreign policy questions. The situation is very different in the United States, where the constitutional system with its checks and balances has stimulated a wealth of research on the relationship between the president and the Congress in foreign policy. It is worth examining the main arguments and findings of this research, especially as they inform our theoretical framework presented in the next section.

The research on Congressional influence in foreign affairs basically consists of two strands of literature. On the one hand, there is an abundance of publications on the rivalry between Congress and the president, driven to a large extent by the argument about ‘two presidencies’, initially proposed by Wildavsky, with the president allegedly enjoying considerably more discretion in foreign affairs than in domestic matters. Much of this research has focused on various Congressional activities, mainly roll-call voting, to analyze partisan coalitions and the positions of individual legislators in a variety of foreign policy issues. On the other hand, primarily international relations scholars, or more precisely those specializing in international political economy, have extrapolated linkages between domestic politics and international negotiations, thus also focusing on the role of parliaments in influencing the outcomes of such global or regional bargaining rounds in trade and security policies.

According to this body of research, Congress seldom questioned executive leadership in foreign policy from the end of the Second World War until the 1960s. In 1950 President Truman had simply informed Congress of his decision to enter the Korean War. Congress was also marginalized during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and in sending troops to Vietnam. But by all accounts, the role of Congress underwent a dramatic change during the Vietnam War. From then on, the interventions of Congress have become more detailed and substantive.  

7 Peters et al. 2010: 3.  
8 We are not focussing in this project on the role of parliaments in European integration. However, individual contributions can of course also incorporate the EU into the analysis, particularly when considering the stronger links between national foreign policies and European level coordination processes and policy choices.  
9 Wildavsky 1966.
Previous discretion to the president has been replaced by a more assertive Congress, willing to question and reject executive decisions in foreign economic and security policies. Partisan consensus, or so-called bipartisanship, gave way to ideological disputes between Democrats and Republicans, and also an increasing number of legislators became active in foreign policy questions. In the 1970s the Senate cut off all funds for US military operations in Cambodia, and Congress succeeded in cutting off aid to South Vietnam. With the 1973 War Powers Resolution over a presidential veto, Congress asserted its intention to check any future presidential decisions concerning use of force. Congress also made significant cuts to the defence budget. In the 1980s Congress took so many decisions contradicting the Reagan administration that arguably US policy toward Central America was effectively made by the legislature, not the president. During the 1990s, President Clinton had to readjust his policies towards Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia in order to avoid more extensive interference from Congress.

Indeed, the original drafters of the US constitution had deliberately given Congress substantial powers in foreign relations, concerning both the declaration of war and trade.\textsuperscript{10} As foreign policy is based less on legislation than domestic policy, the toolkit of Congress with regard to foreign policy contains a broad array of instruments. In addition to voting on budgetary items and ratifying international agreements, members of Congress can set ex ante limits to presidential action, change the rules of delegation in the direction of less executive discretion, or use public posturing and grandstanding to influence foreign policy. For example, Congress has introduced stricter reporting requirements or procedures that force the president to consult Congress prior to decision-making or during international economic negotiations and military conflicts. Congressional influence is on average stronger under divided government.\textsuperscript{11}

There are also interesting differences between various categories of foreign policy issues. Questions about use of force seem particularly reserved for the executive: any effective parliamentary control must primarily be exerted ex ante, with parliaments themselves also recognizing that the executive needs a certain level of manoeuvre for the successful conduct of military missions. The War Powers Resolution provides a good example. It was intended to curb and constrain president’s right to use force abroad, making sure that the executive consulted Congress and also got its approval during military operations. According to the resolution the president can send armed forces into action abroad only by authorization of Congress or in the case of a national emergency. The president is required to notify Congress within forty-eight hours of committing armed forces to military action; the resolution also forbids armed forces from remaining for more than sixty days, with a further thirty-day withdrawal period, without authorization for the use of military force or a declaration of war by Congress. No president has acknowledged the constitutionality of the resolution, and several presidents have disregarded it. President Reagan did so in 1981 when sending the military to El Salvador; likewise President Clinton in 1999 during the bombing of Kosovo and President Obama in 2011 when he did not seek Congressional approval for the attack on

\textsuperscript{10} Schlesinger 1989.  
\textsuperscript{11} For a review of this literature, see Raunio 2014.
Libya, arguing that the resolution did not apply to that action. Many voices inside Congress have also argued that the resolution is too ambitious and goes too far — some issues are simply just better left to the executive, and the president needs a certain level of discretion for the efficient conduct of military operations.\textsuperscript{12}

Moving beyond the Congress, Peters and Wagner compared the war powers of forty-nine legislatures between 1989 and 2004, showing that parliamentary veto power over military deployments is relatively widespread, albeit still restricted to a minority of countries in their study. A parliamentary veto right over troop deployments is associated less with general aspects of the political system (e.g. the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems) and more with the specific culture and past experiences of a country, together with the level of threat it faces. Past experiences of lost wars with heavy casualties appear to contribute to the institutionalization of parliamentary veto rights over warfare. The best examples are Japan or Germany, where the experiences of the Second World War produced strong concerns about misuse of executive freedom and extensive parliamentary involvement in military issues. Furthermore, the external security environment plays a role, with higher levels of threat associated with lesser parliamentary powers over troop deployments.\textsuperscript{13} Joint military missions, coordinated primarily by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations, and the EU, or collective defense clauses create further problems for parliamentary involvement. In the context of accession to NATO and the EU, many Central and Eastern European states relaxed their parliamentary restrictions and abolished their parliamentary provisos for NATO and EU operations.\textsuperscript{14} Dieterich et al. examined the parliamentary war powers of EU member states in relation to degree of participation in the Iraq War that started in 2003, finding that countries that were involved militarily had ‘basic’ or ‘deficient’ parliamentary war powers, while countries with ‘comprehensive’ war powers made no contribution beyond logistical support.\textsuperscript{15} Also analyzing the degrees of participation in the Iraq War among thirty countries, Mello stressed that parliamentary veto rights alone were not a sufficient constraint, emphasizing instead the interaction between constitutional rules and party politics: “under conditions of broad executive majorities or partisan convergence mandatory parliamentary approval is unlikely to amount to a legislative veto point.”\textsuperscript{16}

Electoral considerations can also favour executive discretion. Overall, delegation to the government can be attractive for parliamentarians if foreign relations are not that important for re-election. And while MPs may vote against trade policies that have negative distributional consequences for their constituencies, attacking the executive on military issues

\textsuperscript{12} Auerswald and Cowhey 1997; Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Stevenson 2007.
\textsuperscript{13} Peters and Wagner 2011; 2014.
\textsuperscript{14} Born and Hänggi 2004; Peters and Wagner 2011; 2014. It was precisely this collective action aspect which made it so surprising when the Turkish Grand National Assembly refused to ratify the government’s decision in March 2003 to permit the United States to use Turkey as an air base for its operations in Iraq. See Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010.
\textsuperscript{16} Mello 2012: 447.
is more risky business and can even result in deputies losing their seats. Parliamentarians may also believe that public criticism of the government might compromise or jeopardize national security. Hence blame avoidance can seem like a persuasive tactic, at least during military operations. The executive, on the other hand, may not always prefer maximal discretion. Governments can ask for ex ante parliamentary approval either because of its positive impact on military morale or in order to avoid domestic opposition in the course of the conflict. 

Parliamentary involvement in trade policy follows a different logic, concerning both the rules of parliamentary engagement and the nature of domestic party-political competition. Overall, foreign trade has much more direct economic distributional consequences, producing winners and losers inside individual countries. As a result, legislative bargaining and voting about trade is at least a priori driven considerably more by constituency interests. Analyses of Congressional decision-making clearly confirm the explanatory power of political economy theories. Overall these results are in line with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem about the economic implications of such policies: countries or constituencies that stand to gain from trade and aid are more supportive of international economic engagement. Legislative support in Congress and other select parliaments for foreign economic aid, trade, and funds for international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is more likely when a legislator comes from a district that is well endowed with a relatively high-skilled constituency. Left-leaning legislators are more likely to favour foreign aid and funding of international financial institutions.

However, this also implies that parliamentary engagement can be influenced by how issues are framed domestically – in line with what is termed ‘securitization’ in international relations literature. After all, as the research reviewed in this section indicates, the executive is normally allowed more discretion in security and military policy than in foreign economic policy, with such delegation and overall parliamentary support particularly pronounced during military conflicts. In the US presidents can benefit from framing foreign policy issues as security or military matters. For example, instruments such as military aid and deployments and bilateral aid allow the president greater freedom from Congressional constraints than foreign economic policy issues. Hence the president can be tempted to use military or security instruments since other types of foreign policy questions are subject to greater legislative constraints. Presidential influence is also stronger in those areas of the federal budget that deal with defence and weaker when it comes to foreign policy areas with less immediate national security connections. However, comparing the impact of the ‘war on terror’ on the legislative–executive relationship in eight countries, the volume edited by Owens and Pelizzo

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17 Parliamentary ex ante acceptance of use of force abroad does not automatically produce favourable domestic conditions for warfare. In the UK, the Iraq War that began in 2003 divided public opinion despite cross-party support in the House of Commons for the government’s action.
19 See Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998.
suggests that parliaments are not necessarily weakened during such crisis, with only three cases — the United States, Great Britain and Russia — providing evidence of executive empowerment.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, there are good reasons to expect that parliamentary influence, and the general interest shown by legislators toward non-domestic matters, will increase in the future. Already in the late 1970s Manning paid attention to the rise of issues falling somewhere between pure foreign and domestic policy — or what he referred to as ‘intermestic’ issues.\textsuperscript{22} As indicated in the introductory section, the post-Cold War era has witnessed significant global and regional integration. As a result, an increasing range of issues previously decided nationally, such as immigration, energy, environment policies or human rights questions, are now subject to strong external constraints or even delegated to EU or international organisations. Such policies also have more explicit distributional consequences for constituencies and can be more expensive than ‘traditional’ or more diplomatic foreign policy issues. Moreover, recent studies from the United States and Europe also show that foreign and EU policy matter in terms of elections and vote choice.\textsuperscript{23} And even in the post-9/11 world, there appears to be more readiness to debate policy alternatives and to question the policies of governments in international affairs. In the Congress individual legislators have also become more active and vocal in foreign affairs, using a variety of parliamentary instruments to shape US foreign policy, particularly when they disagree with the president about foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{24}

The literature reviewed in this section shows how parliaments have several avenues to influence foreign policy — from setting ex ante limits to governmental action to holding the ultimate veto power in treaty ratification. By all accounts, the level of executive drift in foreign policy has decreased over the decades, perhaps in part through the higher interdependence of domestic and foreign policy agendas. As foreign affairs have clearer and more varied domestic distributional consequences, legislators have more incentives to engage in foreign affairs. At the same time it is nonetheless important to recognize certain real-world constraints. Essentially none of the studies claim that legislators in the US or elsewhere would enjoy the same level of information about foreign affairs than members of the executive branch. Hence there is a persistent problem of informational asymmetry, and just as in domestic policy, many of the procedural innovations or reforms introduced by parliaments have been designed to address such asymmetries. The executive also has considerably more resources to invest in foreign affairs, and in the end it is always the government that represents the country in international negotiations. With these cautionary remarks in mind we shall now turn to our analytical framework.

\textbf{Theoretical framework}

\textsuperscript{21} Owens and Pelizzo 2009; see Scott and Carter 2014.
\textsuperscript{22} Manning 1977.
\textsuperscript{23} E.g. Aldrich et al. 2006; De Vries and Tillman 2011.
\textsuperscript{24} Carter and Scott 2004; 2010.
The study of legislative-executive relations is primarily interested in the balance of power between the parliament and the government, and the ways in which the former can control or influence the actions of the executive. This literature is often couched in terms of ‘parliamentarization’ or – more frequently – ‘de-parliamentarization’, with the latter particularly pronounced in research about parliamentary involvement in regional (EU) and global governance. Instead of privileging or even endorsing one view over the other at the very outset of this project, we suggest conceiving of legislative-executive relations as a continuous process of (re-)calibration of powers and competences in response to developments within the political system, on the one hand, and in a state’s international environment on the other hand.

To a large extent, such a process of continuous (re-)calibration of legislative-executive relations is captured by principal-agent (PA) theory, which is recognized as a highly useful framework for analyzing the ways in which the parliament can seek to control the government. This approach conceives of parliament as the principal and the executive as the agent. Its core assumption – that the agent can have interests systematically different from the principal – is particularly applicable to the case of legislative-executive relations in foreign affairs: although both share a general interest in the state’s security and welfare, the executive is more susceptible to the demands and pressures of the international environment and other executives whereas the legislature emphasizes the need to align foreign policies with the preferences of the citizens and the public. Indeed, a standard argument in US foreign policy literature is that the president tends to be more internationalist, preferring more extensive foreign engagement while legislators, representing geographically small constituencies, are more parochial in their outlook. The same goes for the fundamental logic of principal-agent interactions according to which the principal is happy to grant independent competences to the agent as long as this relieves the principal of the burden to invest the necessary resources itself. However, the principal is assumed to be alert to the possibility that the agent privileges its own interest over the principal’s and is prepared to take action in order to reduce ‘agency slack’ or ‘slippage’. Thus, PA-theory captures cases of both executive dominance and of tight legislative control.

The principal-agent model is particularly suited to studying legislative-executive relations in parliamentary systems in which the executive by definition depends on majority support in parliament. Although strict party discipline has led to legislative-executive relations often being trumped by the relations between the governing majority and the opposition, the latter has never entirely replaced the former. In addition to the institutional foundations of

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25 Martin et al. 2014.
28 Strøm 2000; Shugart 2006. The application of PA-models is more complicated in presidential systems in which both executive and legislative come into power independently of each other and can both be conceived as agents of the electorate as the true principal.
preference divergence referred to in the previous paragraph, ideological differences may also shape relations between the principal and its agent. Even in the case of single-party majority governments (like those normally in the UK), lack of cohesion inside the ruling party may act as a significant constraint on the prime minister and her government. And under multi-party coalition cabinets, the norm in European democracies, the coalition partners most likely have different preferences, also regarding foreign policy. In such cases the parliamentary groups of the governing parties, particularly those of the junior parties in the cabinet, have stronger incentives to curb executive discretion.

Drawing on these basic arguments of PA-theory and on the previous empirical research outlined in the previous section, we suggest four working hypotheses:

1) The powers of executive should grow in response to external threats or hostilities. Historians of state building have identified external threats and hostilities as main driving forces of executive empowerment. As discussed in the previous section, especially in liberal democracies ‘securitization’ has been a strategy of executives to sideline established checks and balances and to claim exceptional competences. We therefore expect a re-calibration of powers and competences in favor of the executive when the international environment turns more threatening and foreign policy issues are successfully securitized.

2) Tighter legislative oversight is triggered by lack of trust in the government. This lack of trust can have two basic sources. First, it can simply result from preference divergence between the parliamentary majority and the government – or from coalition parties wanting to keep tabs on one another. Second, it can follow executive failure which includes both the government’s inability to achieve political aims and, more frequently, its unwillingness to comply with the rules and procedures set by the principal. Examples of the latter include (secret) arms exports to country which a parliament explicitly blacklisted. The resulting doubts about the agent’s trustworthiness may lead to stricter reporting requirements and stronger ex ante control mechanisms. In the US the divisive experience of the Vietnam War was crucial in bringing about the War Powers Resolution and overall more assertive congressional behaviour in foreign policy.

3) The level and type of parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs varies between different categories of questions. In line with research on US Congress, we expect MPs to be more attentive and also more assertive in questions that have more direct economic and social distributional consequences for their countries and constituencies and that are also less tied to security policy. In regional or global negotiations on foreign trade, energy, environment and immigration there is no single national (security) interest at stake, and hence MPs should be more willing to publicly criticize the government. In security policy, parliamentary engagement should be at its peak at the ex ante stage – for example before troops are

29 Kaarbo 2012.
30 E.g. Müller and Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2008; Strøm et al. 2010; Martin and Vanberg 2011.
deployed – with the executive then allowed discretion during the military operation. Thus we should also find variation between types of parliamentary engagement. In security policy, and particularly during a conflict, the legislature probably is content with receiving information from the government (or exchanging information behind closed doors of committees). In non-military questions, on the other hand, MPs should be more likely to use similar instruments as in domestic policy – plenary speeches, oral and written questions, press releases and other more public accountability mechanisms. 32 Finally, when the issue is not controversial and without direct distributional consequences (e.g. implementation of development policy or a geographically distant military conflict), the parliament is probably happy to sit back and just follow developments based on government reports.

4) Right-wing parties display a greater preparedness to grant discretion to the executive. Parliaments are party-political institutions, and hence our final hypothesis focusses on the potential differences between parties of different ideological backgrounds. In the literature on political parties it is often argued that right-wing parties are more prone to centralization and leader dominance, with leftist parties in turn placing more emphasis on the rank-and-file and the extra-parliamentary party organization. That is, right-wing parties are ideologically more willing to grant discretion to their leaders, while left-wing parties have a tendency for more inclusive decision-making. 33 In foreign policy leftist parties (including the Democrats in the US) may well be more internationalist, preferring stronger (non-military) international cooperation 34, but when it comes to actual foreign policy decision-making they will be more favourable to broader domestic participation, including parliamentary engagement.

However, in PA-theorizing, and more broadly in international relations literature, it is also emphasized that the agent may well benefit from stronger parliamentary constraints, especially before entering regional or global negotiation rounds or military conflicts. It is of course predominantly argued that the structural two-level games logic of international bargaining shields governments from parliamentary control. The executive branch uses international institutions to insulate themselves from parliaments and other domestic actors, and to push through or legitimize even unpopular reforms. And beyond such possible strategic considerations, global or regional ‘multi-level’ governance is by its very nature intergovernmental, thus empowering governments at the expense of legislatures. 35 But importantly, the two-level game scenario also emphasizes that governments are often constrained by domestic actors such as legislatures that in the end can unilaterally veto the

32 Burgin 1991; Patten 2005; Martin 2013.
33 E.g. Duverger 1954; Krouwel 2012.
34 Rathbun 2004; Schuster & Maier 2006; Mello 2012.
35 E.g. Bache and Flinders 2004; Benz and Papadopoulos 2006; Enderlein et al. 2010; Bellamy 2011. Legislatures have responded through the creation of transnational or regional parliamentary assemblies and more regular inter-parliamentary cooperation, with European parliaments especially engaged in a variety of parliamentary networking arrangements. It appears that the main function of this activity lies in exchange of information, but more research is needed to establish the actual importance of the various forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation (Slaughter 2004: 104-130; Marschall 2005; Kraft-Kasack 2008; Šabić 2008; Crum and Fossum 2013).
agreements, and that the executive can use this legislative constraint as a bargaining chip. This latter feature is known as the ‘Schelling Conjecture’\(^\text{36}\), according to which an executive whose hands are tied by a domestic ratification constraint such as a parliamentary veto can negotiate more favorable outcomes than an unconstrained executive.\(^\text{37}\)

Ex ante legislative engagement can also increase the credibility of the negotiators and have a positive impact on the eventual implementation of the pacts. For example, focusing on Congressional support for economic sanctions, executive agreements, and food aid, and the role of national parliaments in the EU, Martin showed that tighter legislative constraints on the executive result in improved implementation records and can improve the bargaining position and credibility of the executive.\(^\text{38}\) More anecdotal evidence also suggests that executives may sometimes invite the legislative to assume responsibilities previously claimed by the executive. For example, the Dutch government deferred the decision on a Dutch military deployment to Uruzgan even though the Dutch parliament has no co-decision powers over military missions. The deferral resulted from the inability of the coalition parties to agree on a common government position.\(^\text{39}\) We are thus also interested in understanding the circumstances facilitating discretion to the government and those situations where executives purposefully seek parliamentary constraints for their actions.

**Call for contributions**

For this collection of papers, we are looking for contributions that analyze legislative-executive relations in liberal democracies in the realm of foreign and security policy. We particularly encourage contributions that compare legislative-executive relations across countries and/or over time.

The contributions to this collection serve a dual purpose: first, they contribute to mapping legislative-executive relations across time and space in the realm of foreign and security policy, especially (but not exclusively) short of the use of military force. This way we aim to gain a more systematic picture of legislative-executive relations in this important issue-area. Second, by exploring the driving forces of executive dominance and parliamentary assertiveness, they contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the dynamics between the legislature and the executive.

\(^\text{36}\) Schelling 1960.
\(^\text{37}\) Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993; Milner 1997; Pahre 2006; Mansfield and Milner 2012.
\(^\text{38}\) Martin 2000. She also made the interesting observation that the executive may try to evade or manage to avoid legislative constrains in one-off situations, whereas parliamentary engagement will be more institutionalized in stable and repeated forms of international cooperation. Certainly the stronger role of legislatures in controlling international trade and the EU than in security policy (where no two conflicts are exactly alike) suggests the real-life existence of such a behavioral pattern.
We aim at submitting the collection of papers to a peer-reviewed journal for a special issue. We plan to have an authors’ workshop in Amsterdam in May or June 2015 to discuss advanced drafts of all contributions.

If interested in contributing to this project, please send a (working) title, an abstract and a short bio to tapio.raunio@uta.fi and w.m.wagner@vu.nl by June 30th, 2014.

Bibliography


