“Populism in Latin America and Europe: A Cross-Regional, Micro-Level Analysis of Populist Political Actors”

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Research Question

- What explains the parallel electoral success of populist political actors in the two continents?
Goals of the Paper

1) Illustrate the conceptual convergence of populist scholars
2) Demonstrate the affinities between the European and Latin American literatures
3) Highlight the shortcomings of past research
Why does Populism matter?

- **In Latin America:**
  - polarization of society
  - poor economic effects
  - concentration of power in the executive
- **In Europe:**
  - anti-immigrant policies
- *Both: anti-system attacks may be harmful*
- Populism as both a consequence and cause of inequality
Conceptualizations of Populism

**Latin America:**
- Classical populists
- Political

**Europe:**
- Conventional
Conceptual convergence

- “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2007: 23)
- Hawkins (2010)
- Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012)
What conditions favor populism?

- Weakened political parties (Roberts 1995, 2003; Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 2007)
- Corruption (Hawkins 2010; Iversflaten 2008)
- Mistrust of Public Institutions (Doyle 2011; Hawkins 2010; Immerfall 1998; Norris 2005)
- Poor Socioeconomic Performance by Governments (Weyland 1999, 2003; Doyle 2011; Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007)
- When citizens envision a “foreign threat” (Rodríguez 2008; Eatwell 2003; Mayer and Perrineau 1998)
Shortcomings of Past Research

- Studies focus primarily on the demand-side (Hawkins 2010; Doyle 2011; Immerfall 2008)
- *Exceptions: Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 2007
- Lack of focus on the negative cases (Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Conniff 1999; Drake 1982; Mazzoleni, Stewart and Horsfield 2003; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Norris 2005)
- Focus on a single country (Ivarsflaten 2008; Madrid 2008; van der Brug and Mughan 2007)
Case Selection

- **Positive Cases:**
  - Morales, Bolivia, 2005
  - Correa, Ecuador, 2006
  - Chávez, Venezuela, 1999
  - FPÖ, Austria, 1990-present
  - Flemish Interest, Belgium, 2003-2010
  - Danish People’s Party, 2005-2011
  - Pim Fortuyn List +Party for Freedom, 2002; 2006-2010

- **Negative Cases:**
  - Latin America- Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru
  - Europe- Ireland, Portugal, Spain, UK
Data and Measurement

- Latinobarómetro 1995-2010
- Eurobarometer 2003-2012
- Levels of confidence in:
  - National Parliament
  - Political Parties
  - National and Personal Economy
- Whether corruption has increased
Confidence in Political Parties in Latin America, 1995-2010 (Higher=worse)

Confidence scores for various Latin American countries (higher scores indicate lower confidence):

- Ecuador: 3.48
- Bolivia: 3.45
- Argentina: 3.38
- Peru: 3.34
- Venezuela: 3.34
- Nicaragua: 3.29
- Brazil: 3.25
- Colombia: 3.25
- Paraguay: 3.25
- Guatemala: 3.24
- Costa Rica: 3.19
- Panama: 3.17
- Chile: 3.15
- Honduras: 3.14
- Mexico: 3.1
- El Salvador: 3.06
- Uruguay: 2.84

Annual Mean: 3.23
Mean Percentage Who Do Not Trust Political Parties in Europe, 2003-2012

Average of Annual %

Ave: 69.8
% Who Do Not Trust Political Parties

Ireland
Portugal
Spain
UK
Confidence in National Parliament in Latin America, 1995-2010 (Higher=worse)

Average: 3.04
% Who Do Not Trust National Parliament in Europe, 2003-2010

- Italy: 69%
- UK: 68%
- France: 63%
- Ireland: 62%
- Portugal: 60%
- Spain: 60%
- Greece: 58%
- Germany: 56%
- Belgium*: 53%
- Netherlands*: 43%
- Austria*: 43%
- Sweden: 35%
- Finland: 35%
- Luxembourg: 32%
- Denmark*: 25%
Trust in National Parliament

- Ireland
- Portugal
- Spain
- UK
Average Country-level Economic Perceptions in Latin America, 1995-2010 (higher = worse)

Average of Annual Means: 3.54
Average Country-level Economic Perceptions in Europe, 2005-2012 (higher=worse)

Ave: 2.64
Negative Cases-Country Economy

Ireland
Portugal
Spain
UK
Latin America: Corruption has Increased A Lot or A Little 1995-2002

Average: 88.9
Micro-level Analysis

- Data- Americasbarometer
- DV: Who did you vote for in the last presidential election?
- Cases:
  - BOLIVIA 2005- Morales won
  - ECUADOR 2006- Correa won
  - HONDURAS 2005- Zelaya
  - GUATEMALA 2007- Álvaro Colom won, Otto Perez Molina as a populist candidate
## Macro-level Economic Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>GDP GROWTH</th>
<th>UNEMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>INFLATION</th>
<th>GINI</th>
<th>POPULIST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia 05</td>
<td>$2477</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador 06</td>
<td>$3564</td>
<td>4.86%</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras 05</td>
<td>$2531</td>
<td>2.33%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala 07</td>
<td>$4031</td>
<td>3.28%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Logistic Regression Results: Presidential Vote Choice

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.61 (0.30)*</td>
<td>-0.39 (0.46)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.10)**</td>
<td>0.07 (0.60)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 30-60</td>
<td>0.17 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.62)</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 60+</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.45)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Econ Same</td>
<td>0.73 (0.14)***</td>
<td>0.35 (0.11)**</td>
<td>0.31 (0.05)*</td>
<td>0.23 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Econ Better</td>
<td>1.05 (0.16)***</td>
<td>0.60 (0.15)***</td>
<td>0.68 (0.20)***</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Parties Average</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.12)*</td>
<td>0.14 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Parties Low</td>
<td>-0.39 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.26)*</td>
<td>0.83 (0.32)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little Corruption</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.12)*</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.19)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Corruption</td>
<td>0.38 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.55 (0.28)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot of Corruption</td>
<td>0.11 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.31)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.51)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Congress Average</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.50)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Congress Low</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 1349 2234 1069 731
Conclusion

- Convergence of definitions
- Congruence of Theoretical Explanations
- Lack of focus on “negative” cases
- Need to look at supply-side explanations
  - Institutional Features
  - Party System Structure
- Need to control for institutional differences