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Copyright - 1997 Sanna Talja
CONSTITUTING "INFORMATION" AND "USER" AS RESEARCH OBJECTS:
A Theory of Knowledge Formations as an Alternative to the
Information Man-Theory
INTRODUCTION
The article concentrates on epistemological and methodological
issues. Theories of the nature of information and its users are
metatheories which guide the formation of concrete research
programs in information seeking research. The article presents
the discourse analytic viewpoint, the "theory of knowledge
formations", as an alternative to the cognitive viewpoint, "the
information man -theory". The implications for the development
of research strategies are discussed.
Many researchers have concluded that the central weakness of the
cognitive viewpoint is that it pays little attention to the
social aspects of information processes, either in terms of the
socio-cultural context of the users or the socio-cultural
context of the information system (see e.g. Capurro 1992,
Frohmann 1992, Hoel 1992, Miksa 1992, Vakkari 1994). Belkin
(1990) has emphasized that we should study large-scale social
knowledge structures in order to understand how and why people
seek information. It is widely recognized that both individual
information needs and institutional information access are
socially conditioned. However, conducting information seeking
research on a macrosociological level has turned out to be
difficult within the cognitive viewpoint, since it is basically
a theory of how individuals process information. The cognitive
viewpoint offers no concrete and obvious solutions to the
question of how to conceptualize and study the socio-cultural
context of information processes.
Capurro (1992, 83) has remarked that the central concept in the
cognitive viewpoint is not information but man. It is a theory
about the information man - about the individual as a seeker and
interpreter of information. Within the cognitive viewpoint, the
study of information processes means studying the user's
mental-cognitive processes. Information is defined as something
that modifies an individual's knowledge structures or knowledge
states (e.g. Ingwersen 1992, 33). Under these premises
information science theory is primarily concerned with the
impact of information on the receiver (Capurro 1992, 87).
In Capurro's (1992, 87) opinion, the main question of our field
is how knowledge is constituted and shared. Also Wersig (1992,
213) proposes that the theoretical framework of information
science should be based on a critical examination of the concept
of knowledge. Thus the user-centered approach in information
seeking research should not mean - and need not solely mean - an
individual-centered or a "subjectivist" research approach as
opposed to the "objectivism" of the classical
intermediary-centered approach (cf. Itoga 1992; see also Dervin
& Nilan 1986).
The discourse analytic viewpoint is basically a theory about the
production of knowledge through language (see also Hall 1992b,
291). The viewpoint abandons the individual as the basic unit of
analysis, and shifts the focus to a more general level: to the
variability of knowledge formations. The socio-cultural context
of information processes is located in discourses, which provide
different perspectives and subject positions for knowledge
construction and systematization.
THE DISCOURSE ANALYTIC VIEWPOINT AS A NOVEL ORIENTATION STRATEGY
The discourse analytic viewpoint is based on the work of Michel
Foucault, especially his "Archaeology of Knowledge" (1972). It
is both a linguistic-philosophical theory and a concrete
research method. Discourse theory is based on specific notions
about language, reality, knowledge, and the individual. These
notions are as valid as a metatheoretical basis for information
science as those of the cognitive viewpoint. In the field of
information science, the Foucauldian discourse theory provides a
novel orientation strategy. It adds to the list of
metatheoretical options available.
Metatheories (like the cognitive viewpoint or discourse theory)
should first and foremost be understood as fictions, which have
a number of practical implications for research (Dervin et al.
1992, 7). Metatheories provide guidelines and strategies for
understanding social phenomena and suggest ways for the theorist
to approach these phenomena. They guide us in talking about or
conceptualizing the events and processes that exist in the
social world (Vakkari 1994, 5). The discourse analytic viewpoint
opens up new possibilities for constituting the "user" and
"information" as research objects.
The discourse analytic viewpoint and the cognitive viewpoint
approach phenomena from different perspectives. The viewpoints
differ primarily in their way of explaining differences - where
the most central differences are located, how differences are
defined, how differences are studied. Dervin (1993) stresses
that we should always conceptualize the explanation of
differences as differencing, a communicating move. Differences
can be conceptualized in multiple ways, and we are always forced
to choose an entry point (ibid., 50). The discourse analytic
viewpoint conceptualizes differences in a way that diverges from
many earlier explanatory models.
In order to make my argument for a research strategy that
abandons the information man as the principal unit of analysis,
I will analyze some underlying assumptions of the cognitive
viewpoint. However, the analysis is both one-sided and
oversimplified, since the cognitive viewpoint is in fact
comprised of many different schools of thought. It can be
applied in multiple ways and its theoretical assumptions are
continuously being developed. This means that a critique of the
cognitive viewpoint is in fact a critique of historical forms of
thought. The dichotomy between the individual's inner world and
external reality did not originate within the cognitive
viewpoint. Western thought since Plato has emphasized the
centrality and sovereignty of the individual. The individual is
understood as the center of awareness, and other subjects and
the external world are seen as extra-discursive objects of
his/her observational processes. As a result, the individual is
seen as an autonomous and fixed entity, distinctly different and
separate from other such autonomous, fixed entities.
The modern subject/object -dichotomy forms the background for
the so-called rationalistic paradigm of information seeking
research (Capurro 1992, 84-85; Frohmann 1992, 142). Within this
paradigm, the focus is on instrumental information use.
Information seeking is studied in clear-cut, most often
professional problem situations. These situations have been used
as the basis for the construction of "paradigmatic models" of
information seeking. Hence research has mainly been concerned
with rational use of information (Capurro 1992, 84; Miksa 1992,
235, 240). The focus is on the importance of information in
problem-solving and rational decision-making.
HOW REALITY GETS CAPTURED IN INFORMATION
It is a convention in LIS-talk to emphasize that each individual
receives and interprets information in his or her own way,
affords it a personal meaning. The reception of information is
mediated by a person's existing knowledge state and knowledge
structures. Information is something that one individual has
actively generated, and something that another individual may
choose to internalize. When information is perceived and
received, it affects and transforms the recipient's state of
knowledge (e.g. Ingwersen 1992, 32-33). The focus of these ideas
is consistently on the consciousness and subjectivity of the
individual.
The emphasis on the allocation of meaning by the individual was
originally intended as a rejection of the notion that
information might have universal applicability and an
unambiguous relation to reality. It was necessary to somehow
incorporate the aspect of meaning into the concept of
information. But, as pointed out by David Silverman (1989,
38-39), a research approach that focuses on "subjective
meanings" is in fact thoroughly wedded to the myth of objective
knowledge, since it is assumed that there are meanings and
fundamental truths which are independent of language and
context. When the research object is defined as
the inner worlds of users, where most of the important
acts of communicating -interrogating, interpreting,
creating, resolving, answering - are performed (Dervin
1989, 217),
it is the individual's interpretations and "inner worlds" that
are taken as facts and fundamental truths. We are still dealing
with a research approach that omits the social nature of all
knowing (Parker 1989). It follows that knowledge is either an
unmediated description of external reality or an unmediated
description of internal reality. It is assumed that we have
direct and unmediated access to the individual's mind. Western
thought since Plato and Aristotle has assumed unity between the
individual's mind and speech (Sampson 1989). Speech is
understood as the unmediated expression of the individual's
original thoughts and experiences. The individual is understood
as an integrated universe and a stable and distinctive whole. As
a result, the individual is set contrastively against other
subjects and the surrounding world. (ibid., 13.)
The emphasis on the user's mental-cognitive processes and
subjective knowledge structures has some important implications
for research. It removes the individual's subjectivity from
collective reality. Theorizing about information processes turns
into theorizing about subjectivity. If we understand that every
individual has his/her own subjective world of meanings and
knowledge structures, then the individual becomes the central
uncertainty factor from the point of view of information
transfer. If the user is seen as a chaotic and individualistic
seeker and interpreter of information, then the other side of
the equation, information, must be something certain and
controllable. In Belkin's (1990, 12) definition, information
science studies "the interaction between people and objective
knowledge, in order to discover more about subjective knowledge
structures".
Following de Mey's (1977) classical definition, Belkin (1990,
12) states that any processing of information is mediated by
concepts and categories which, for the individual, are the model
of his world. In the cognitive viewpoint, concepts and
categories are defined as "mental representations" (Ingwersen
1992, 44). If we accept Wittgenstein's (1972) statement that
private languages cannot exist, subjective knowledge structures
and world models cannot exist, either. Concepts and categories
are material signs of language. The world and its objects are
not constituted and defined in individual cognition, but in
representational practices, discourses. The focus on subjective
meanings misses the critical role played by linguistic
constructions in social life.
It is understood that language originates in and is learned
through individual acts of interpretation. The individual's
thinking is understood in Platonic terms: as pre-linguistic,
immaterial ideas which can for communication purposes, as if in
afterthought, be attached onto the signs of language. But there
are no immaterial concepts, categories or ideas. If I invent a
new word for an idea of mine, I obviously cannot use it if I
want to make myself understood to other people. Communication
would hardly be possible without a common frame of comprehension
and negotiation. No concepts, thoughts or meanings can exist
outside language. Language is the very stuff that consciousness,
internal speech, is made of (Volosinov 1986). Without language
we cannot think. Without words there is no consciousness
(Williams 1977).
Even if we must act in everyday life as if language described
reality and our thoughts in a direct and unmediated way,
language is not just a tool or an instrument to be taken up and
put down at will, when we have something to communicate
(Volosinov 1986). Language constitutes the person as a subject
in the first place. From the point of view of the individual,
language is always already there, finished: it cannot be
created, it can only be used - either routinely or reflexively.
Specific sociohistorical traces contained within the language
system permeate the very key of personhood (Sampson 1989, 13).
They structure our experiences, also the very experience of
consciousness and self, even as those traces are usually
unavailable to immediate awareness (ibid., 13). Normally
linguistic concepts and categories function rather like a pair
of glasses: what we look at, we see through them (Wittgenstein
1972).
Meanings, values, and ethical principles are not constructed by
individuals, they are constructions that have been created in
social interaction (Williams 1977). The study of information
processes is research into social and interactional processes of
sense-making. The constantly evolving sense making -theory also
replaces the cognitive viewpoint's focus on mental
representations and subjective knowledge structures with the
concept of dialogue (Dervin et al. 1992; Dervin 1994). Its
epistemological and ontological basis closely corresponds to
that of the discourse analytic viewpoint. Language is seen as
the primary shaper of observations and interpretations of the
world (see Dervin 1991, 46-47; Dervin et al. 1992, 7).
Information is about what people do with language and what
language does to people.
Both theories view information as something that is formed in an
episteme, in a web of knowledge typical for a historical period.
Within this web also the individuals are shaped into subjects,
at the same time as they together, by communicating, weave the
web anew. Information is about developing models of reality,
which is something people inevitably do together with others. As
Dervin (1994, 372) puts it, reality gets captured in
information. Information holds variable and constantly changing
versions of reality. The discourse analytic viewpoint locates
the socio-cultural context of information processes in
discourses, which provide different perspectives and subject
positions for knowledge construction.
EXPLAINING INFORMATION SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
Information needs are often regarded as the cause of information
seeking behavior (Itoga 1992, 341). It is understood that
information needs arise when an individual finds himself in a
problem situation, when he or she no longer can manage with the
knowledge that he or she already possesses. In Kuhlthau's (1993,
347) formulation information seeking is caused by "uncertainty
due to a lack of understanding, a gap in meaning, or a limited
construct". The challenge for research is to design information
systems which enable people to move from uncertainty to
understanding (ibid, 353). Information is a supplement to the
user's understanding of the surrounding world when in a state of
uncertainty (Ingwersen 1992, 60).
When conceived in this way, information is something more
fundamental than messages or meanings (see Ingwersen 1992, 25).
Information must be instructive about the nature of reality, it
must point to what is real, and therefore it must reduce the
uncertainty in reality (Dervin 1991, 44). Information is
understood as something that the individual necessarily needs in
order to cope with problem situations. It is the prerequisite
for coping in modern society and for rational behavior:
Rational behaviour, in all senses "rational", needs
knowledge. This knowledge has to be transformed into
something that supports a specific action within a
specific situation. People cannot perform this task
appropriately by naive means because the situation of
knowledge has changed. Rational behaviour in this sense
has become very complex. Actors - whether they are
individuals, groups, organizations, or cultures- need
help (Wersig 1992, 208-209).
The humanistic objective of information science is to help
people to gain knowledge, to help them solve problems and cope
with the various tasks and situations they run into. The
rationale for research has to do with the capability of
information to support problem-solving and rational decision-
making. Researchers do not assume that all individual or social
problems can be solved by improving access to information. But
often information needs are implicitly understood to concern
only the kind of information believed to be necessary to people.
It is assumed that there is a consensus on what kind of
information people need in order to cope in modern society.
Often research is implicitly based on a universalizing notion of
knowledgeable and rationally behaving subjects (see also Roberts
1982, 96-97).
In the reduction of uncertainty -discourse objectivity and
autonomous expert knowledge are implicitly viewed as properties
of information and the mediator, whereas subjectivity and
uncertainty, varied emotional and knowledge states, are
properties of the user (see also Frohmann 1992, 142). Between
objective knowledge structures and the individual's subjective
knowledge structures exists the intermediary's "zone of
intervention", which according to Kuhlthau's (1993, 84)
definition is
the distance between the actual developmental level as
determined by independent problem solving and the level
of potential development as determined through problem
solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with
more capable peers.
The discourse analytic viewpoint stresses that the variety in
knowledge structures is not caused by differences in individual
interpretations. Novel or alternative interpretations evolve
form new kinds of social experiences, practices and relations
(Williams 1977). Knowledge and knowledge structures are neither
objective nor subjective, but intersubjective, produced within a
shared system of meanings. Knowledge consists of a mix of
scientific or expert knowledge and unconscious, selective and
culture-specific background assumptions. In certain social
contexts and within certain social interests these assumptions
appear as factual or valid, whereas in other social contexts
they are seen as questionable.
Dervin (1994, 379) emphasizes that uncertainty, knowledge gaps,
lack of understanding and limited constructs are part of our
information world. They pertain to information and information
systems as much as to users. Points of incompatibility and
uncertainty can be found everywhere, since knowledge is
constructed in "systems of dispersion" (Foucault 1972). Novel
interpretative frameworks are developed as "corrections" to
prior frameworks. Established perspectives do not disappear with
the appearance of new ones. Each field of knowledge consists of
several competing discourses, based on incompatible and
contradictory assumptions. When the lense of the production of
knowledge changes, the facts also change.
Belkin (1990), too, emphasizes that knowledge structures are
socially and culturally constructed. But an emphasis on the
social and cultural nature of knowledge structures might have a
number of implications for research. Belkin (ibid., 12) views
the cultural nature of knowledge structures as a possibility for
attaining generalizable knowledge about the information seeking
orientations of various groups. In the attempts to take the
social and cultural context of information seeking into account,
the notion of mutually different, but internally coherent
individuals is often replaced by a notion of mutually different,
but internally homogenous groups. It is difficult to incorporate
the contextual nature of information or the contextual nature of
the user into theories that view information as the reduction of
uncertainty.
Differences in information seeking behavior have been explained
mainly by the following factors: 1) differences in the cognitive
skills, knowledge states and motivation of individuals, 2)
differences in the educational levels and socio-economic
circumstances of social groups, 3) differences in the problem
situations or subject areas that trigger information seeking.
Generalizations about differences between individuals or groups
are often problematic. Firstly, the diversity of the
individual's social roles, tasks and identities is not taken
into account. When, for instance, an essentialist notion of
"social class" is adopted, it is assumed that a person's level
of education or socio-economic state regulates his/her behaviour
and possibilities in all areas of social life. Social class is
assumed to be a real and primary context of people's behaviour,
not just an established classification practice.
Secondly, it is impossible to get unmediated knowledge about a
person's cognitive skills or even information seeking behaviour,
because the ways in which they are accounted for are always
mediated by culturally constructed interpretative repertoires.
The explanations should not be taken as facts about the
permanent attitudes or actual behavioural patterns of
individuals or groups (Potter & Wetherell 1987). There is, for
instance, a wide range of views on how an individual best
manages in modern, complex society. Individuals (researchers and
users alike) are conscious of their views on society and of what
they see as problems, but not of the initial conceptualizations
and choices of perspective that allow them to formulate their
views and see certain things as problems.
The sense making -theory does not explain differences in
information seeking behaviour as differences between individuals
or groups (see Dervin 1989, 226). Differences are explained by
contextual factors: by the situations, subject areas, interests
or problems that trigger information seeking. When information
seeking is examined as a context-dependent activity, it is
essential to start with the assumption that individuals are not
stable and autonomous entities. An individual is an "information
seeker" only inside a particular practical context, a particular
subject area or knowledge field (Capurro 1992, 90). The
potential for various lines of action in an information seeking
situation does not primarily depend on the individual. The
potential for finding the desired information depends on the
first place on the knowledge representation and classification
practices.
Discourse analysis is a subject-based approach. The unit of
study is a particular area of information seeking, a concrete
subject area or a knowledge field, and the objective is to
identify the different knowledge formations, or discourses,
inside that field. It is assumed that competing discourses
approach the subject area from different perspectives, which in
turn causes systematic variation in knowledge structures
(knowledge representation and classification practices).
Hjorland and Albrechtsen's (1995) "domain analysis" is a
research approach of a related nature, a collectivistic,
knowledge formation -oriented viewpoint as opposed to user-
psychological and individual-centered approaches (see ibid.,
401-402).
KNOWLEDGE FORMATIONS
Discourse theory emphasizes that the user has different
identities and subject positions in different social contexts
(Wetherell & Potter 1988). In different situations an individual
may, for instance, be parent, child, teacher, student,
professional, customer, buyer, seller. The person's rights and
duties, positions and resources, competencies and knowledge
states, vary according to context. However, the individual
cannot freely set the terms for his/her identities and
interpretations. Since language is what consciousness is made
of, we have to use the signs of language also when we make sense
of and describe ourselves and our understanding. When we use
words, we formulate ourselves from the point of view of our
community (Volosinov 1986).
Interpretative resources contain residues from the whole history
of the societal form. But interpretative resources are variable
and conflicting, continuously changing and developing - as are
the subjects and their knowledge states. The subject is
constituted and fixed in place by socio-historical language, but
otherwise the subject is open-ended, fragmented and
multidimensional (Parker 1992, 87; Sampson 1989, 14). It follows
that research into "user perspectives" is in fact research into
more general knowledge formations.
The potentials, boundaries, and modalities for the production of
knowledge are set by discourses. Discourses are knowledge
formations that do not consist of single fragments of knowledge
but of broad totalities which give form to reality. A discourse
is a group of statements which provide a language for talking
about - i.e. a way of representing - a particular kind of
knowledge about a topic (Hall 1992b, 291). A discourse makes it
possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits
the other ways in which the topic can be constructed. Discourses
systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault
1972, 49). Discourses consist of particular kinds of
conceptualizations that allow reality to be "known" from a
certain angle, and from that angle only. In different
discourses, different aspects of reality become the focus of
knowledge production. Discourses provide the reserve of themes
and points of view that we use in sense-making. They enable us
to know certain things and to speak in certain ways. (Foucault
1972; Hall 1992b).
Discourses are based on a set of implicit statements, unspoken
theories about the nature of things (Foucault 1972). Statements
about the social world or the world of information are rarely
ever simply true or false: they are selective. Two completely
conflicting statements can be simultaneously "true", because
they both bring out one side of the matter. When the
starting-points and assumptions inherited from historically
formed discourses are consciously examined, they always appear
relative and open to questioning. But they mostly work as
unconscious premises and unexamined reasonings. They build a
body of knowledge which appears to be independent of specific
interests and aspirations (Foucault 1972). But the perspective
of knowledge production is always limited, and excludes from the
concept of knowledge some aspects of reality (Hall 1992a).
Discourses are based upon classification procedures: on the
selection, organization and combination of concepts. Concepts
that have been tied together on the basis of certain background
assumptions, are on the basis of different assumptions detached
from each other, and linked to other concepts (Volosinov 1986).
Let us, for example, think about the words "the people",
"trash", "postmodern". In some discourses the words have a
positive meaning, in others a negative one. Very different
ideologies are concentrated in the same words. Since concepts
(like information) belong to the language system, novel
discourses have to work with the concepts established by prior
discourses. But various social interests create their own
accents and reference fields for the mutual concepts (Volosinov
1986). Discourses win over the speaking subjects by formulating
a positive associative content for concepts by which they can
locate and present themselves in a meaningful and favorable way
in the field of social relations (Hall 1992a).
USERS AS CULTURAL EXPERTS
From the discourse analytic viewpoint the central problem for
information science is the variability of knowledge formations.
This problem cannot be explained away by the equation objective
knowledge structures/subjective knowledge structures. If we
assume that the boundaries of social knowledge are set by
discourses that categorize the social world and bring phenomena
into sight, it follows that information, information systems and
information needs are all constructed within existing
discourses. Information needs are linguistic and cultural
constructs, as are information systems.
The discourse analytic viewpoint views the production and use of
information as something that is connected to variable social
life-worlds and interests. From the discourse analytic
viewpoint, the central problem facing information systems is not
that the individual is incapable of conceptualizing his or her
information need or does not formulate it in the same way as the
information producer or the information system. Since we share
language and culture with others, and since they have made us
what we are, we have a common ground on which to act and
communicate (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Both the user and the
information system function with existing concepts and
categories. The central problem facing information systems is
how to incorporate multiple viewpoints into the system.
Institutions are generally built upon fairly stable and dominant
forms of thought, which Foucault (1980) calls "regimes of
truth". The interpretative positions provided by dominant
discourses may not be meaningful for the description and
understanding of all cultural forms and social life-worlds. The
language user (including the information system) does not
normally reflect on the subject position adopted in knowledge
production and systematization, because certain approaches
appear as natural and inevitable in certain contexts. It has,
for instance, been natural in the context of information seeking
research to focus on information needs arising from problem
situations. But it is equally natural to assume that information
needs arise more from selected interests and cultural expertise
than from the lack of knowledge.
The theoretical arguments presented in this article suggest two
important changes in the research perspective: 1) the
conceptualization of users as knowing subjects, as cultural
experts, and 2) the conceptualization of information systems as
participation systems in the organization and systematization of
social knowledge (see also Dervin 1994, 380). It is equally
important to study the socio-cultural aspects and ideological
nature of the information systems, as it is to study the socio-
cultural aspects of the users. If the focus is shifted to the
study of knowledge formations, information seeking research need
not be either user-centered or information system-centered. The
knowledge formation-orientation implies that we should study
both the cultural production, organization and boundaries of
information needs, and the cultural production, organization and
boundaries of information systems. Information has ethical and
political dimensions, and these dimensions are unavoidably also
a part of the functions of the information system (Capurro 1992,
90-91).
The discourse analytic viewpoint emphasizes the user's
embeddedness in culturally bound discourses. Information is not
seen as that which instructs, but as messages produced within
specific historical and cultural contexts and specific social
interests. The cognitive viewpoint views the user as a possessor
of "anomalous knowledge states", as a non-knower (see also
Capurro 1992, 86). It also looks at knowledge as individual
mental states rather than as a social and cultural process or a
cultural product (Hjorland & Albrechtsen 1995, 409). Thus the
ways in which the "user" and "information" are conceptualized
have effects on research strategies (and also on the designing
of information systems). If the users are seen as uncertain
people who need help, there is a risk that the objective of
helping the users is implicitly grounded on a faith in objective
expert knowledge existing outside history, social relations and
contradictory interests.
The main objective of information science is people
confused by the situation of knowledge usage (which
will become even more confusing in the emerging
postmodern society). There is the need for people to be
educated to behave in this knowledge environment, there
is need for rules and guidance for these people, for
systems and other means of helping them find their way
(Wersig 1992, 209).
The objective of helping people to cope in the modern knowledge
environment is unavoidably based on a one-sided and limited
vision of knowledge. According to Capurro (1992), information
science needs a practical and rhetorical turn. This entails the
conceptualization of users as knowing subjects in the
practical-discursive context of everyday life. Wersig (1992,
213-214) suggests that information science research should be
based upon the reflexive examination of such concepts as
"knowledge", "reality", "rationality", "mastery of life",
"fiction", "art" and "technology". It should study the meanings
and interpretations they receive in different social contexts
and fields of knowledge. Common sense or privileged meanings
produced by dominant discourses are not enough to grasp these
concepts, as specific interpretations set the basis for research
strategies.
FOOTNOTES
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