The Jacobite movement is deeply rooted in the history of both Scotland and England. It also exemplifies some of the difficulties the union of England and Scotland faced during its first years and decades. The traditional view of the Jacobite uprisings as a distinctly Scottish phenomenon aimed towards the English government is not, however, completely correct. Jacobitism was a many-sided phenomenon which went through many changes and had different manifestations at different times. On many occasions it had more features of a Scottish civil war than of a Scottish struggle against the English, as both the rebels and the government troops who were sent to quell the rebellion were often predominantly Scottish. It is even very difficult to distinguish the supporters and the opponents of the movement: people changed their views quite often, and there are no clear-cut social or political reasons for any distinct group of people to have been supporting the Jacobites. As Michael Lynch says in his book Scotland: A New History:

for most, whether amongst the Highland so-called 'loyal clans' or the Lowland nobility, support for one or other was marginal and calculated, a matter of expedient judgement rather than outright principle. The prime difficulty in assessing the strength of support for Jacobitism is that the arithmetic of these calculations fluctuated wildly over the course of the four decades between the first and last of the Jacobite plots, in 1708 and 1745-6. (P. 318)

Thus, there are also many different reasons for the outbreak of the rebellions, as well as for their eventual failure.

As many other historical events, Jacobitism also has its roots, in a way, in the religious situation of the time. Scotland and England of the seventeenth and eighteenth century were predominantly Protestant, but from 1685 to 1688 they had a Catholic king, James VII of Scotland and II of England. The people were highly suspicious of him, and were afraid of how safe their Protestant faith would be under a Catholic king. William of Orange was therefore called by the Whig party to invade England, and he became the new, Protestant king in 1689. James then fled to France. Most of England and the Lowlands of Scotland supported the new king, but there were those, especially in the Scottish Highlands, who remained true to James, whom they thought to be their legitimate monarch, and eventually acted to have him restored as the king. This was the beginning of the Jacobite movement. (Fitzroy Maclean, Scotland: A Concise History, pp. 138-139)

The first Jacobite attempt at the restoration of James VII came in 1689. Highland clans loyal to James had been assembled, and troops were sent by William to pacify them. In the battle in Killiecrankie, the Jacobites managed to drive the government troops away, but the commander of the Jacobites, Viscount Dundee, was killed in the battle, and because the army was left without a leader, they lost the advantage they had gained by the victory in the battle, and had to withdraw. However, the government remained uneasy about the situation in the Highlands, and tried to take control of the area with measures which included an order that the chiefs of the clans had to take an oath of allegiance to King William. Only two chiefs failed to take the oath by the date required, and one of them, MacIan of Glencoe, was made a threatening example to the rest of the clans: many of the members of his clan were murdered by government troops in what became known as The Massacre of Glencoe. The king did gain some more control over the Highlands with his measures, but especially the Massacre of Glencoe also turned many Scottish people against the king and was a source of very critical comments. This probably served to increase the popularity of the Jacobite cause in Scotland, even in the Lowlands, and probably was one of the reasons why the most serious rebellions, those of 1715 and 1745-6, came about. (Maclean, pp. 139 - 146.)

There was also another attempt at Jacobite rebellion before 1715. This happened in 1708, when the Jacobites managed to gather some support for the cause in France. James Edward, the son of James VII, sailed towards England, accompanied by French troops, with the intention of joining Scottish troops in rebellion. The plan, however, did not work at all. The ships were forced to turn back to France by English war ships before they had even landed, and the rebellion was thus quelled before it happened. However, although this attempt was unsuccessful, it was the most broadly supported of all Jacobite rebellions, and it had support from groups who never later supported the Jacobite cause. (Lynch, p. 319)

There were also rumours of a possible Jacobite rising in 1714, when Queen Anne fell ill. She did not have a direct heir, and it had been agreed that she would be succeeded by a German Princess, the Electress Sophia of Hanover, the granddaughter of James VI, but the restoration of James was still considered another possibility by the Jacobites, and they were encouraged by the widespread support they still had in Scotland. A Jacobite coup seemed likely, but it was finally prevented by the swift action of the Whig administration. Thus, when Queen Anne died, she was immediately succeeded by the son on Electress Sophia, George of Hanover, and he became the King of Scotland as well. According to Maclean, this situation would have provided a good opportunity for the restoration of James, if he and the Jacobites had acted differently: "Had James been prepared to turn Protestant or had he and his supporters shown greater initiative, there seems little doubt that he could now without much difficulty have become King." The unpopularity of George I provided an opportunity for the Jacobites, but they failed to make use of it. (Maclean, p. 158)

George I was extremely unpopular in Scotland from the beginning of his reign. He was seen as a foreigner who had very negative feelings towards the Highlanders, and he was considered a king of the English, not the Scottish. This strengthened the Jacobite feelings in Scotland, especially in the Highlands, and thus in 1715 there were again rumours of a Jacobite rising, and many expected it to be successful. The rebellion did not, however, receive the assistance the Jacobites had expected from France, because Louis XIV, who had been favourable towards the Jacobites, had died only days before the rebellion, and the Duke of Orleans, who was Regent, did not support the cause as much. The only foreign assistance this rebellion eventually received was some financial help from Spain. (Lynch, p. 329) The Scots, however, decided to act even without help from France. The rebellion, led by Lord Mar, began in two different places:

plans were laid for Mar to raise the banner of the Pretender on the Braes of Mar . . . on 6 September 1715; this was a rising of the ruling classes of the north-east Lowlands and the adjacent areas of the Grampian Highlands . . . But simultaneously Mar had also been in touch with the chiefs of the Central highlands to organise a march on Glasgow; this was far more of a clan rising than that in the northeast, but it hardly got off the ground. (Lynch, p. 328)

The march on Glasgow, as well as other attempts by the western clans, were unsuccessful, and they eventually joined the eastern force. This meant that an important part of the strategy had not worked at all, and it was probably one of the most important factors in the failure of the rebellion. The eastern forces had some success: there was much popular support for them in the area, and the troops advanced quickly, meeting with little resistance. (Lynch, p. 328) An important episode in the rebellion was the battle at Sheriffmuir in November: "In a confused and uncertain battle fought over undulating ground, the left wing of each army was broken by the right wing of the other. Both sides claimed victory, but the tactical advantage was left with the government side."(David Ross, Scotland: History of a Nation, p. 227) The Jacobite troops started retreating, and the rebellion was lost even before James Edward himself had arrived in Scotland, and much of the blame for this has been put on Lord Mar, who, although a successful politician, was not a good military leader.

The 1715 rebellion was seen by the government as a warning, and they wanted to prevent another one from happening. Two Jacobite leaders were executed, and many others were punished otherwise, peerages and estates were forfeited. There was also an attempt to disarm the clans, but it was not successful, as it mostly disarmed the clans who were loyal to the government, and the measures made the Union and the King even more unpopular in Scotland. (Maclean, pp. 165 - 166) In 1719, the Jacobites planned a new rebellion, this time with promises of more assistance, and troops, from Spain. 5 000 Spanish troops were supposed to join the clans in rebellion, and Spain was also to provide arms for at least 30 000 soldiers. Ill fortune, however, spoiled the plan. Most of the Spanish troops never even landed because of a storm. Only a small "sideshow" group landed in Scotland to join with a small group of Scottish Jacobites, but the two forces were in constant disagreement over strategy, never managed to advance according to their plans, and finally had to withdraw after a minor confrontation with the government forces. (Lynch, p. 331) After 1719, there were new attempts by the government to gain stronger control over the Highlands and prevent further rebellion. New garrisons were built and the infrastructure of the area was improved, but this did not benefit the government as much as had been hoped. On the contrary, the new roads actually helped the Jacobites in the 1745-6 rebellion. (Ross, p. 228)

After 1715, the support for Jacobitism was in continuous decline. By the late 1730s, there was widespread discontent with the current monarch, but it did not manifest itself as Jacobitism. It was, however, because of this decline that the new leader of the Jacobite movement, James's son Charles Edward, decided that immediate action would be the Jacobites' best hope. The Jacobites again relied on the French, and started planning a rising together with them. According to the plan, Charles "was to cross to Scotland, bringing with him 10.000 French troops and adequate supplies of arms and money." (William Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present, p. 148) The Highlanders agreed to this, and in early 1744, the French troops set sail. However, violent storms once again prevented the reinforcements from reaching Scotland, and the rising could not be executed. If the plan had worked, it is quite likely that large amounts of Highlanders would have joined in, and the chances of success would have been good, but ill luck was again the preventive factor. (Ferguson, pp. 148 - 149)

After the misfortune of the 1744 attempt, France was concentrating on fighting on different battlefields, and no help for the Jacobites was available. Charles, however, decided to raise a rebellion without their help, and sailed to Scotland with few companions, and a small amount of money. He fitted two ships, and even of those, one was forced to turn back after an encounter with an English war ship. His reception was not enthusiastic, because he did not bring any troops with him, but he managed to gather some support and the troops marched to Edinburgh, where they made the decision to invade England. The decision was made by a very narrow majority, and many Highland chiefs were opposed to it. The march was, however, fairly successful. The troops met with little resistance, although they did not receive as many new recruits as they had hoped for. The Jacobite army got as far south as Derby. There they held a council of war about what the best course of action would be. Charles spoke for continued bold action, and continuing the march towards London. His advisers, however, disagreed, and said it would be best to withdraw to Scotland. Charles reluctantly did what his advisers told him to do, and the troops started withdrawing in December 1745. This, however, was not the end of the fighting. There were some battles on the way, including the Jacobite victory at Falkirk. (Lynch, p. 336-337) The final battle, where the hungry and exhausted Jacobites met the reinforced government troops, was at Drummossie Moor on 16 April 1746. Lynch describes the situation as somewhat confused:

The battle should not have been fought where or when it was. Charles's men were outnumbered . . . and were badly positioned so that any advance had to be made uphill, against entrenched mortars, and into the teeth of a biting north-easterly wind. Over 1,000 Highlanders fell, but only three-fifths of the Prince's army had been in the field and the immediate reaction of his commanders was that the battle had not been decisive. (P. 337)

Some Jacobites still hoped that the fighting would continue, but Charles's decision to flee after the battle meant that the rebellion was over.

After the rebellion, some of its leaders were executed, and there was an intensive search for Charles, but he managed to escape to France with the assistance of his supporters. Many others fled to the continent as well.Other strict measures were also taken to punish the Highlanders for the rebellion, and to ensure that it would not happen again. It became, for example, forbidden to play the bagpipes or wear a highland dress. The Highlanders were disarmed effectively. There was also a violent campaign of mass reprisal. Unlike the earlier occasions when there were attempts to bring the Highlands to order, these measures were now effective, and they managed to bring about changes in the Highlands and integrate the area more closely with the rest of the country. After the 1745-6 rebellion, the traditional Highland way of life started gradually disappearing, and there were no further remarkable attempts at a Stewart restoration. (Ferguson, pp. 153-154)

It is clear that there were several different reasons for both the outbreak and the failure of the Jacobite rebellions. No one single reason could be named to be the most important factor; rather, the combined effect of the different features of the situation worked to first cause and then end the Jacobite rebellions. One of the main causes for the outbreak of the rebellions was obviously the problematic situation of the monarchy, especially its reputation in the Highlands. The monarchy, and more specifically the new Hanoverian king George I, was highly unpopular. He was considered a foreign monarch, who did not appreciate many features of his new country, especially of the Scottish Highlands. Many government attempts to control the Highlands, including the Massacre of Glencoe, served to increase the discontent. It was only natural that the Highlanders, who felt that they were not treated well enough by the new king and the government, would want to search for alternatives, and this combined with their old loyalty to the Stewarts made them willing to work actively for a Stewart restoration. An important reason for the initial successes of the two rebellions was also the fact that the government had no effective means of controlling the Highlands and of making it a loyal part of the monarchy. This was partly due to the fact that the area itself was geographically very inaccessible, and partly because the local tradition and the clan system did not allow for outside control. The lack of control made it impossible to suppress the rebellions early on. The government only managed to gain control over the Highlands, and to change Highland society remarkably, after the 1745-6 rebellion.

The rebellions were also encouraged by the fact that help from abroad was expected. England was at war with France, and the Jacobites thought that as they could help France by engaging the English troops in battle on another front in the north, the French would be willing to help them and support them both financially and by sending reinforcement troops. The French were, indeed, supportive of the cause and made plans to send over some troops, as well as weapons and money, and this did very much to encourage more Highlanders to join in the rebellions. With foreign assistance, the Jacobites considered their chance of success to be very good. Unfortunately, it finally turned out that the ill luck and other disappointments with the amount of help they received from abroad eventually also contributed to the downfall of the rebellions.

Furthermore, an important role in the birth of the rebellions was played by the action of some individuals who, for example, negotiated with France about assistance, and who led the troops to battle. The most famous example of these individuals is, of course, Prince Charles Edward, without whose personal initiative and boldness the rebellion of 1745-6 would hardly have broken out. It has, however, also been suggested that in a sense the rebellions had more to do with local interests than many of the leaders ever realised:

neither the English ministry nor the Pretenders ever understood the extent to which the rebellions were provoked not by loyalty to the Stewart cause but by hatred of the great clan Campbell, whose steady aggrandisement at the expense of smaller, weaker and less politically minded clans was was a cardinal objective of Government policy . . . This was largely the reason why the rebellions in 1715 and 1745 produced so brilliant an explosion in the north and so little effect in the south: Lowlanders had no special reason to hate the Campbells or to love the Stewarts (T. C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830, p. 223)

It can thus be seen that it is not only the willingness to restore the Stewart monarchy that caused the Jacobite rebellions. The rebellions also had much to do with many different features of Highland life, as well as with the era, which with, for example, several continental wars provided opportunities for the Jacobites for plotting and looking for foreign allies.

The reasons for the failure of the rebellions seem to be even more complex than the reasons for their outbreak. One central reason is simply bad luck. On several occasions, unfavourable winds prevented Jacobite reinforcements from the continent from even reaching either Scotland or England. It also seems that the Jacobite troops often had bad luck in their choice of a leader: on several occasions, an unwise decision made them lose the advantage they may have had, and this often led to defeat. This happened, for example, in 1715 with the indesiciveness of Lord Mar. The 1745 decision to withdraw from Derby has also been disputed. It has been said that had the Jacobites continued their march towards London from Derby instead of turning back, they would have rapidly received strong support, and new recruits, from English Jacobites, who at that moment were waiting to see what would happen. It was also highly likely that they would not have encountered much resistance on the way to London, the number of government troops on their way was reasonably small. There was a large amount of Jacobite supporters in London as well, and this was one of the reasons why the city was in panic, expecting a Jacobite invasion, which may very well have been successful. France was also planning to land in England, if the Jacobites reached London. (F.J. McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745: the Final Campaign, p. 131) This would probably have resulted in a very different conclusion to the rebellion. Thus, it seems that one reason for the final defeat of the Jacobites was the decision made in Derby, a decision that seemed less dangerous, closer to conventional war tactics than the bold action supported by Charles Edward himself. In this sense, it could be said that the defeat was partly due to the majority of the leaders of the rebellion, who made an unbeneficial decision. This is, however, mere speculation, because it can never be known, what would have happened if they had decided otherwise. A contrary argument states that an advance on London would have been too dangerous and that the troops would have faced defeat on the way there anyway. It is impossible to say, which of these two arguments might be closer to truth.

Another major factor, possibly even the single most important one, which caused the rebellions to fail, were the problems with foreign support. The Jacobites expected to receive reinforcement troops, weapons and financial assistance from France, and to a lesser extent from Spain, on several occasions, but the assistance never fulfilled their expectations, for one reason or another. Bad luck was often concerned, as were previous unsuccessful attempts, which made the foreign allies reluctant to try again. Problems with the allies were a constantly recurring theme in the Jacobite rebellions and their attempts, and always closely associated with their failure. The lack of foreign support made the Jacobite army so weak that they did not have realistic chances of success in either of the rebellions.

It was, however, not only with foreign support that the Jacobites had trouble. For most of the time, they did not even have sufficient support in their own country. The Jacobite cause cannot be said to have brought together the whole Scottish nation, or even a certain part of it. It was, rather, the cause of a fairly small, and changing, group of people, and the support decreased more with each failed attempt of rebellion. Only the most loyal Jacobites remained committed to the cause, and managed to persuade their clan members to join. One important factor in the decline of support for the Stewarts was religion. Few Protestant Scots were willing to fight for a Catholic King, and therefore his convertion might have increased his support considerably, but as this did not happen, many people remained suspicious of him and of what might happen to their religious freedom if he ever became King. By 1745, it was very difficult for the Jacobites to raise even Scottish troops in support of their cause, and the English Jacobites also failed the rebellion leaders' expectations by not joining them. It was often - for example in 1745 - the case that the Highlanders would have joined the rebellion if there had been a considerable amount of foreign reinforcements, but as this always failed to happen, they remained sceptical of their chances of success and did not want to participate in the rebellion. The troops also had constant trouble with desertion, and it was difficult to retain even the support they had already received. This made the troops very unstable, and fighting at times very difficult. The Jacobites were also eventually outnumbered in battle by the government troops, because the government troops received fresh reinforcements at critical moments, whereas the Jacobites did not.

Another important feature in the failure of the rebellions was, of course, the enemy. It was easy for the Jacobites to start the rebellions, because the government did not have an opportunity to prevent it, and the first victories were often gained by the Jacobites by swift action. But as the fighting continued, the government troops received reinforcements and became more prepared to fight, whereas the Highlanders often suffered from desertion and never received enough new troops to be able to fight effectively, and they eventually suffered from hunger, exhaustion and low morale. In the decisive battles of the rebellions, the Jacobites were, therefore, outnumbered by the government troops, and were also often more tired of fighting, and the defeat was unavoidable. Thus, even the final battle of the 1745 rebellion, the Battle of Culloden, is an example of how ill luck, desertion and lack of support, unwise tactics and the growing strength of the government troops form a combination that leads to an unavoidable defeat.

In conclusion, it can be said that it was most importantly the combined effect of many different factors that caused first the outbreak and then the failure of the two main Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745-6. There were many single important factors, but none of them could have caused the events alone. The main reasons for the birth of Jacobitism were the unpopularity of the King and the existence of another possible king, whose restoration the clans loyal to him were hoping for. A Stewart restoration was the central aim of the rebellions. But the rebellions were also encouraged by the lack of government control in the Highlands, inspiring leaders, tradition, and many other reasons. The failures, on the other hand, were caused by poor leadership and unfavourable decisions, problems in keeping the troops together, and sheer ill luck, as well as the strengthening of the enemy. But probably the most important single factor in the failure of the rebellions was the lack of support for them. The continental allies of the Jacobites failed to meet their expectations in the amount of assistance they could offer, which had much to do with the aforementioned bad luck, and later on with their lack of interest in the whole cause. The failure was also due to the lack of domestic interest and support for the rebellions. Although there was widespread discontent and criticism of the Hanoverian monarchy, it was never strongly demonstrated by active mass support for Jacobitism. Even many of those who may have hoped for a Stewart restoration were unwilling to join the battle, and the poor initial success of the Jacobites made even more people abandon the cause. Thus, even though there may have been acceptance of the Jacobites, the active support never grew to be large enough for them to be able to succeed in their attempts. The worst enemies of the Jacobites can thus be said to have been bad luck and a lack of interest.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ferguson, William, Scotland: 1689 to the Present. The Edinburgh History of Scotland, Volume 4. Edinburgh 1978.
Lynch, Michael, Scotland: A New History. London 1991.
Maclean, Firzroy, Scotland: A Concise History. London, 1993
. McLynn, F. J. The Jacobite Army in England 1745: The Final Campaign. Edinburgh 1983.
Ross, David, Scotland: History of a Nation. Edinburgh 1998.
Smout, T. C. A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830. London 1969.